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Abstract  
In many parts of the world water is a scarce resource that needs to be managed sustainably 
and efficiently. In Chancay-Huaral basin in coastal Peru, water is distributed mainly between 
upstream located agriculture and downstream located municipal water supply system. The 
ever growing demand of water craves for efficient reallocation of the resource. 
The aim of this thesis is to develop a hydro-economic model for payments for watershed 
services (PWS) between agricultural and municipal water users. The model reflects changing 
land quality and is based on profit maximizing behavior of the program participants. The 
purpose is to study whether the PWS instrument would fit well to the institutional setting and if 
it encourages to more modest agricultural water use. The main emphasis is on the model but 
the PWS program design is discussed throughout the study.  
According to the model results, the PWS scheme does decrease agricultural water use and it 
provides an incentive for agriculture to participate in PWS program. The agricultural water use 
depends highly on the land allocation decision that is driven by the profitability of a crop in 
certain land quality. However, for municipal water supply system the incentive to participate in 
PWS program is not as strong, because the profit it obtains in the program is zero, whereas in 
other situations the profits are positive. 
While agricultural side of the model seems quite sensible, the future research would tackle the 
issue of linear municipal water demand and elaborate that part of the model. Also the 
consumers’ willingness to pay for drinking water is an interesting future research topic. 
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Tiivistelmä 
Monilla alueilla vesi on niukka luonnonvara, jota tulee hoitaa kestävästi ja tehokkaasti. 
Chancay-Huaralin jokialueella Perussa vesi jakautuu pääosin yläjuoksun maataloudelle ja 
alajuoksun yhdyskuntavesilaitokselle. Yhä kasvava veden kysyntä vaatii tehokkaampia veden 
allokointitapoja. 
Tämän tutkielman tarkoituksena on kehittää hydroekonominen malli 
vesiekosysteemipalvelumaksuille (PWS = payments for watershed services) maatalouden ja 
yhdyskuntaveden käyttäjien välille. Malli heijastaa vaihtelevaa maanlaatua ja olettaa 
osallistujien maksimoivan voittojaan. Tarkoitus on tutkia, miten ekosysteemipalvelumaksu 
instrumenttina sopii alueen institutionaaliseen kenttään ja kannustaako se maataloutta 
vähentämään veden käyttöä. Pääpainotus on teoreettisen mallin kehittämisellä, mutta 
ekosysteemipalvelumaksuohjelman suunnittelusta käydään keskustelua koko tutkielman ajan. 
Mallin tuottamien tulosten mukaan PWS-ohjelma vähentää maatalouden veden käyttöä ja 
tarjoaa maataloudelle kannustimen osallistua ohjelmaan. Maatalouden vedenkäyttö riippuu 
maa-alan allokoimisesta eri kasvien välille. Kasvien valinta puolestaan riippuu niiden 
kannattavuudesta erilaisilla maan laaduilla. Sen sijaan yhdyskuntaveden tarjoajalla ei ole yhtä 
vahvaa kannustinta osallistua PWS-ohjelmaan, koska sen voitot ohjelman alaisuudessa ovat 
nolla kun ne muissa tapauksissa olisivat positiiviset. 
Vaikka maataloudellinen päätöksentekomalli antaa järkeviä tuloksia, tuleva tutkimus voisi 
keskittyä lineaarisen yhdyskuntaveden kysynnän ongelmiin ja kohentaa sitä puolta mallista. 
Lisäksi yhdyskuntaveden kuluttajien maksuhalukkuuden tutkiminen olisi mielenkiintoinen 
tutkimuskysymys. 
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Abstracto 
Pagos por los servicios de las cuencas en Perú: Aplicación al riego y  al uso municipal del agua 
En muchas partes del mundo agua es un recurso escaso que necesita ser gestionado de manera 
sostenible y eficiente. En cuenca Chancay-Huaral en Perú, uso de agua es distribuido principalmente 
entre la agricultura situado aguas arriba y el sistema de abastecimiento de agua municipal ubicada agua 
abajo. La creciente demanda de agua ansia para prácticas de reasignación más eficiente. 
El objetivo de esta tesis de maestría es desarrollar un modelo hidroeconómico para las pagos por los 
servicios de las cuencas (PWS) entre los consumidores de agua municipal y para la agricultura. El 
modelo refleja cambios en la calidad del tierra y se basa en el comportamiento de maximizacion de 
beneficios. El objetivo es también estudiar si el instrumento PWS encajaría adecuadamente en el marco 
institucional y si fomenta a un uso más discreto de agua agrícola. En la tesis se enfatiza principalmente 
en el modelo, no obstante el diseño del  programa PWS se debate durante todo el estudio. 
Conforme a los resultados, el PWS disminuye el uso del agua agrícola y establece un incentivo para los 
agricultores para participar en el programa. El uso agrícola del agua depende en gran medida de la 
asignación de tierras, impulsada por el rendimiento de un cultivo en una determinada calidad tierra. Sin 
embargo, el incentivo para que el sistema de abastecimiento de agua municipal participe en el 
programa no es tan convincente, ya que el beneficio obtenido en el programa es igual a cero, mientras 
que en otras situaciones se obtienen beneficios positivos. 
Aunque  la parte agrícola del modelo parece bastante razonable, el siguiente estudio afrontara la 
cuestión de la demanda de agua municipal lineal y elabora dicha parte del modelo. Además, se incluye 
la disposición de los consumidores a pagar por el agua potable como un tema interesante en la tesis. 
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1. Introduction 
Water use is crucial for human well-being. It is used for drinking, sanitation, irrigation and other 
functions that might not be so evident or visible to the eye. Water offers directly and indirectly 
several ecosystem services that are beneficial to human economic activities such as agriculture and 
food production. However, the nexus of water and agriculture is facing many environmental and 
social issues. Since population is increasing globally, there is a growing pressure towards food 
production and water availability. In order to fulfill the physical needs of the growing population, 
agricultural activities need to be accelerated, while maintaining the water availability for other 
purposes. Consequently, especially in the developing countries the question is not only about 
increasing agricultural productivity by increasing water use and agricultural land area but it is also 
about increasing general efficiency and sustainable and fair distribution of water.  
Watershed services are typically seen as public goods. Characteristics of a public good entail that 
no-one can be excluded from using the service and that one’s consumption does not affect to the 
availability of service for others (Porras, Grieg-Gran, & Neves, 2008). The reality of water 
resources, however, is different. If an individual abstracts huge amount of water from a river or 
pollutes the river, it indeed does affect to the other users’ water availability and quality.  
Consequently, water has similarities with both renewable and non-renewable resources, depending 
on the site. When there is no storage, surface water needs to be allocated sustainably between 
competing users. With regard to groundwater, abstracting it now affects its future availability and 
thus allocation over time needs to be considered. (Johansson, Tsur, Roe, Doukkali, & Dinar, 2002). 
If property rights are defined so that “polluter pays,” the abstracting individual causes a negative 
externality to the other users, which he must compensate.  Therefore watershed services would 
rather be classified as common pool resources, implying that excluding someone from using the 
resource is at least difficult, if not impossible, and by using the resource one has an impact to the 
availability of the resource to the others. 
This research concerns the allocation of water between agriculture and municipal water supply 
system in Peru. The aforementioned challenges are present also in Peru, even though Peru is 
currently classified as an emerging country. The study area of this master’s thesis is Chancay-
Huaral river basin, in which agricultural sector in the upstream is the main user of water while the 
downstream municipal water supply system needs to adapt to whatever water is left available. This 
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master’s thesis looks into the issue of inefficient water use in Peru in terms of social welfare and 
whether a Payment for Watershed Services (PWS) -scheme could improve the situation. 
Wasteful use of water and the arid conditions drive the overexploitation of water resources in 
coastal Peru, where the study area is located. There are many reasons that are causing this. Because 
of informational asymmetries and loose executive policies water is used inefficiently and unevenly 
within river basins. For example, there is not currently a volume based pricing scheme for water use 
for the upstream farmers which leads to overuse of water and inefficient irrigation practices. 
Agricultural water use is inefficient and lot of applied water is lost and not used by crops. The local 
environmental governance adds its own challenges to the issue. Demand for fresh water increases 
continuously due to both growing population and urbanization. Water issues are connected with 
many societal and economical questions, such as sustainable development and growth, equity 
questions, and poverty reduction. For these reasons there is a need to change or strengthen water 
management practices and policy in Peru to be more efficient in ecological and economical terms. 
1.1. Objectives and structure of the study 
The main aim of this master’s thesis is to analyze if a payment mechanism e.g. payment for 
watershed service (PWS) is suitable to be applied in Peruvian watersheds and in particular in 
irrigation activities and municipal water supply system. Defining how to determine the rate of the 
payment is another main focus. The analysis of PWS bases upon literature and has a theoretical 
view point. Even though the possible program design is discussed throughout the thesis, the purpose 
is not to deliver actual payment for watershed service program but to ponder how the mechanism 
would possibly fit to the Peruvian context and how could the payment be determined from the 
viewpoint of environmental economics. 
The study method is to develop a hydro-economic model that reflects the behavior of profit 
maximizing agricultural water users and municipal water supply system. The hydro-economic 
model consists of agricultural model, municipal model and hydrological constraint. The agricultural 
model is based on heterogeneous land quality model in which the optimal agricultural inputs and 
outputs depend on the land quality. The agricultural land is divided into a number of parcels which 
are of different quality and hence produce different amounts of outputs. The demand for municipal 
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water is modeled as consumer demand for drinking water which is price-dependent. Hydrological 
constraint is exogenous to the model but it determines the total water availability. 
1
 
The study consists of literature review about PWS as a tool, case studies addressing the applicability 
of payment scheme for water issues in general and of a model that illustrates the economic aspects 
of the problem. The structure is as follows. Chapter 2 is a literature review that looks into the PWS 
literature and addresses the feasibility of PWS in general. The chapter also reviews agricultural 
water needs and behavior relating to agricultural water use, and municipal water production. 
Chapter 3 outlines the institutional characteristics of Peruvian water management system and 
overviews the study site, river basin of Chancay-Huaral. Chapter 4 presents the hydro-economic 
model and Chapter 5 collects the data and calibrates the functions needed for the model simulation. 
Finally, the results are presented in Chapter 6, further discussion is provided in Chapter 7 and 
conclusions in Chapter 8.  
                                                          
1
 Finnish Meteorological Institute (FMI) collaborates with SENAMHI (Servicio Nacional de Meteorología e 
Hidrología del Perú) and this thesis is part of the collaboration project called Aquafutura, which aims to 
develop a decision-support system for the use of scarce water resources in Peru. This objective is followed in 
this thesis. 
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2. Literature Review 
This chapter reviews the PWS literature and introduces the concept of payments for watershed 
services. The chapter ponders the PWS program design and feasibility of the instrument. Also the 
agricultural and municipal water needs and important factors influencing irrigation and municipal 
water withdrawals are addressed because the objective of this study is to apply the PWS mechanism 
to irrigation and municipal water use. The purpose of this chapter is to collect the main attributes 
that have an impact on either irrigation or municipal water withdrawals so that the crucial attributes 
would then be incorporated in the final hydro-economic model. 
2.1. What is PES or PWS? 
When a fee is collected from a user or incentive s are offered for providers of ecosystem services, 
the terminology of such programs is payments for environmental or ecosystem services (PES). 
However, when watersheds are in question, equivalent programs are often referred as payments for 
watershed services (PWS). In general, much of the literature that covers the theoretical background 
for payment schemes refers to PES since that is more general term compared to PWS, which is 
more specific and recent term that is used when the service is related to water. Therefore both 
abbreviations are simultaneously used in this study, depending on the source, but they actually refer 
to the one and the same thing. 
Policy instruments used in environmental economics try to internalize those externalities that 
human (economic) activities cause into the decision-making process of an individual. Commonly 
favored market based policy instruments are taxes or subsidies because they are rather easy to 
establish. The idea behind subsidy is to encourage desired behavior whereas the idea behind tax is 
to cut down the unwanted behavior. Tax is relatively cost-efficient in achieving reductions in 
pollution whereas subsidy can even increase total burden on environment by attracting new and 
extensive economic activities. Other mechanisms like permit trading schemes and command and 
control measures are typical as well. (Hanley, Shogren, & White, 2001). 
Various market-based mechanisms exist in the water sector. These include water transfers, cap and 
trade systems, water exchanges and banking, and else. These mechanisms try to create a market for 
water and the market would then screen out the users that encounter biggest costs for water use. 
(MEA, 2005).  
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Creating market for water has a negative ring to it because water has public good features and 
because it is so crucial for human needs. Yet markets can be compelling for many reasons, e.g. 
increasing efficiency in resource allocation from traditional use such as agriculture to more growing 
uses such as municipal water use (MEA, 2005) or encouraging more efficient water use. However, 
the global discussion is now transitioning from markets to payments because market has strict 
criteria to which water management programs often does not fit, whereas payment is a more flexible 
term (Porras, Grieg-Gran, & Neves, 2008). 
Payment for environmental services (PES) is a market based instrument that allocates payments 
between ecosystem or environmental service (ES) providers and users and seeks to internalize 
externalities and lessen the environmental burden caused by livelihood activities simultaneously 
with creating additional economic value to the users (TEEB, 2010 etc.). 
According to Wunder’s definition PES is a voluntary transaction in which a well-defined ES is 
being bought by a (minimum one) service buyer from a (minimum one) service provider if and only 
if the service provider secures service provision. This is the conditionality pledge of PES. Another 
important feature in PES is additionality which implies that the improvement in environment would 
not have been achieved without the payment scheme. These two criteria are important in terms of 
program efficiency and effectiveness. (Wunder, 2005). 
PES programs aim to encourage individual landowners to adopt practices that are privately 
unprofitable but socially desirable by making those practices more profitable to the individual 
(Engel, Pagiola, & Wunder, 2008). Payment schemes offer incentives for landowners to change 
their way of water use in form of a payment. The idea behind PWS is to turn the ecosystem service 
into a commodity that can be sold. Often this requires less strict definition about PWS than is 
claimed by Wunder (2005). (Porras, Grieg-Gran, & Neves, 2008). 
Figure 1 shows the desired outcome of a PES scheme as case A, where the rate of the payment is 
sufficient to make the socially-desired practice profitable also to the service provider or land owner. 
Yet PES programs might face many types of inefficiencies. In the case B the rate of the payment is 
not enough compared to the value of the service and the win-win situation is not reached. In the 
case C the costs of reaching the win-win situation exceed the actual value of environmental service 
which is not efficient use of money. In the case D the desired land use practice would have been 
adopted regardless of the payment, which is also inefficient. (Engel et al. 2008). 
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Figure 1. Analyzing efficiency of PES. According to Pagiola (2005) in Engel et al. (2008). 
Defining the ES that is targeted in the PES program is crucial. According to Wunder (2005), there 
are four types of ES that generally stand out: carbon sequestration and storage, biodiversity 
protection, watershed protection, and landscape beauty.  
PES programs can be divided into three categories based on the goal of the program: pollution 
control, conservation of natural resources and ecosystems, and generation of environmental 
amenities that have public good properties. (Bulte, Lipper, Stringer, & Zilberman, 2008). 
2.2. Feasibility of PWS 
Common principle applied in environmental law is the polluter pays principle, which means that the 
agent who pollutes should compensate the damage of pollution. In developed nations where 
economic agents have liquidity this principle seems fair but in developing nations many agents that 
use natural resources and pollute are rather poor and the polluting or abstractive activity can be their 
lifeline. Often they are small entrepreneurs or subsistence farmers and land owners that use water 
and other resources to make the most of their land but impact negatively the balance in the 
ecosystem at the same time. Therefore, in developing nation settings, PES that relies on the 
beneficiary pays principle is attractive (Engel et al., 2008). 
PWS scheme has the potential to internalize negative externalities relating to the uneven 
distribution of water resources and inefficient irrigation practices and it could also increase 
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community welfare in the river basin. Other market-based instruments may share this feature as 
well but they often have other negative influences. PWS is always locally tailored which allows 
flexibility and empowerment of people. The difficult part in PWS programs, though, is to plan the 
program design in a way that fits to the context and also to define sufficient level of compensation. 
The use of command and control instruments such as performance and design standards does not 
allow flexibility for firms to reach the goal, unlike market-based instruments that provide incentives 
and price signals (Hanley et al. 2001). Volumetric pricing of water and tradable water rights are 
examples of incentive-based water allocation that is the primary alternative for quantity-based 
allocation. Farmers are responsive to prices in their irrigation water demand but when water prices 
are extremely high, increasing water price even further is a blunt instrument and might not have an 
influence on water demand. (Rosegrant, Ringler, McKinney, Cai, Keller, & Donoso, 2000).  
According to Rosegrant et al. (2000), tradable water rights or licenses could reduce information 
costs, increase farmers’ acceptance and participation, empower water users, and provide security 
and incentives for investment and for internalizing external costs of water uses. According to their 
model simulation from Maipo river, Chile, irrigation water withdrawals would actually decline 
(albeit little but still) when water rights can be traded because agricultural users could sell the rights 
to the municipal and industrial users for a profit. If water rights could be traded, water would move 
from less productive uses to higher-valued urban water uses and would benefit farmers monetarily 
at the same time. Also municipal users would gain benefits. (Rosegrant, Ringler, McKinney, Cai, 
Keller, & Donoso, 2000).  
Environmental subsidies can create perverse incentives and command and control policies are quite 
inflexible. Moreover, weak governance, high transaction costs and lack of monitoring in developing 
countries hinder the effectiveness of these policies. (Engel et al. 2008). Cost-share subsidies that 
share the fixed costs of a conservation technology may lead to expansion of land under production. 
While tax induces farmers to exit the industry, subsidies induce entry. (Khanna, Isik, & Zilberman, 
2002). In one sense PWS is like a subsidy but fortunately through program design the negative side-
effects of subsidies can be avoided. For instance, in the payment scheme the participants are 
identified and contracted which means that the number of ES providers receiving subsidies is 
limited and does not increase unless scheme allows it. PES programs are also more flexible than 
command and control policies since every program is designed individually corresponding to the 
site characteristics. 
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Input that is not utilized by crop may be a source of environmental pollution. Green payments could 
induce greater adoption of conservation technology in different ways: by sharing fixed costs of 
technology adoption, by subsidizing the reduction in input use, or by combining the two 
mechanisms. Cost-share subsidy is effective in reducing pollution only if the technology switching 
effect is large and if conservation technology has a large pollution reducing effect. This could be 
costly because of high capital costs typically related to technology adoption. (Khanna, Isik, & 
Zilberman, 2002). 
In Moyobamba, Peru, municipal water company proposed to introduce a PES scheme to reduce 
upstream sediment loads that had caused its costs to increase about 20 %. The idea was to surcharge 
the water consumers in Moyobamba and subsidize farmers to change their land use practices to be 
less sediment-prone. In order to test how PES could work and what would be the way to deliver the 
service, an economic analysis on four different land-use change scenarios was made. Results show 
that changing to shade-coffee cultivation provides best trade-off since it leads to a win-win 
situation: it offers greater medium term income for farmers and increases environmental services 
for the municipal water users. Without subsidies the farmers would continue slash-and-burn 
activities because there are high initial investment costs relating to land-use change. However, since 
the watershed would need also restoration and not only protection, PES-like scheme that is not so 
strict could be more appropriate to the area than a pure PES scheme. (Quintero, Wunder, & Estrada, 
2009). The Moyobamba scheme in northern Peru was later implemented and is now ongoing 
(Renner, 2010). 
Surprisingly, only one national and five local schemes in which agricultural water users contribute 
directly to fund PWS schemes worldwide were found by Porras et al. (2008). Respectively, in 17 
local PWS schemes domestic water users are charged for watershed services. Majority of the 
schemes seem to target water quality. In some schemes the fee is additional surcharge and in some 
the water users can choose the payment level they want. (Porras, Grieg-Gran, & Neves, 2008, pp. 
43-44). This implies that PWS schemes targeting agricultural users are still quite scarce. 
Kosoy et al. (2007) conclude that giving attention to social relations, perceptions, bargaining power, 
property rights and institutional aspects rather than just to the economic valuations provides more 
useful inputs to payment scheme design in situations when payment scheme between downstream 
and upstream stakeholders is feasible. They also remind that if the rate of the payment is not 
sufficient in economic terms and the economic foundation of PES is compromised, there might still 
be other perceived benefits they call “intangibles”, like other environmental and subsistence 
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benefits (firewood, scenery, shade etc.), relating to program participation. PES as an instrument has 
the potential to resolve conflicts in upstream-downstream settings but at the same time it might 
induce changes in social perceptions of the property rights. (Kosoy, Martinez-Tuna, Muradian, & 
Martinez-Alier, 2007). This could be interpreted so that if the current water management is causing 
turmoil between stakeholders and issues relating to efficient and sustainable water use, payment 
scheme could bring a mutually accepted solution.  
PES initiatives require several considerations from policy makers: 
- who to pay and which services to pay for 
- form and rate of payment and how they are dispersed 
- tenure rights and their necessity 
- evaluation of cost-efficiency and effectiveness of the scheme 
- role of intermediaries 
- monitoring and enforcing compliance 
- linkage to poverty alleviation. (TEEB, 2010).  
This list is important in terms of complete program design but since the main focus of this study is 
to model the rate of the payment, only those points essential to setting the appropriate rate are taken 
into closer scrutiny below. The payment rate is dealt with in Chapter 4. 
Identifying participants and ES 
There are many watershed services that are essential in terms of community welfare and agriculture. 
Land use has an influence on the watershed services; basically these impacts are issues related to 
quantity, quality and evenness of the river flow (Porras et al. 2008, p. 29). The ES in question and 
the participants of the scheme are determined based on the local circumstances and environmental 
objectives. Those actors that have great influence on the provision of the service are providers and 
those who would benefit from the service are the demanders. 
PWS schemes in developing countries typically use four types of land-use proxy for the 
improvement of watershed services: improved land use practices, reforestation of commercial 
plantations, conservation and protection of existing ecosystems, and rehabilitation of degraded 
ecosystems for protection (Porras et al. 2008, p. 33-37). How the ecosystem service is delivered in 
practice depends on the local conditions and is part of the program design.  
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Yet it is important to acknowledge that hydrological processes within and beneath the soil include 
various sources of uncertainty. Therefore quantifying the amount of water that is provided by a 
specific land manager upstream to a specific downstream user is practically impossible. Lack of 
basic research information on this relationship is a major problem in implementing a payment 
scheme for example in Tanzania. (Branca, Lipper, Neves, Lopa, & Mwanyoka, 2011). 
Nature of the payment 
Because of the complexity of the watershed processes, the key challenge in designing a PWS 
scheme is in determining the rate of the payment that actually would result in the desired outcome 
for the downstream community (MEA, 2005). In their analysis of current PWS schemes, Porras et 
al. (2008) list three types of mechanisms used for the price determination: administratively 
determined (non-negotiable) payments, direct negotiation between the buyer and the seller, and 
negotiation through an intermediary. Regardless of the mechanism, there has to be some kind of 
evaluation of the costs and benefits of the scheme, either completed by an intermediary or the 
stakeholders themselves. However, the important question to be solved is how to determine the 
optimal rate of the payment. 
One option to determine the rate of payment would be by conducting a willingness to pay (WTP) 
survey in the area but this would require a lot of resources. Other possible way would be to arrange 
an auction for the service delivery, which would determine the opportunity costs of land, but this is 
more popular in developed countries because of stricter regulation (Porras et al. 2008). Opportunity 
cost refers to a cost or profit that is forgone when the resource cannot be used twice (Hanley et al. 
2001). In their comparative study of three Central American PWS schemes Kosoy et al. (2007) 
estimated the opportunity costs by calculating three proxy variables. These variables were net 
profits from on-farm activities that would be foregone with payment scheme, expected rent from the 
land if it was rented and providers’ willingness to accept the land-use change as defining the fair 
price for the scheme.  
Funding the program 
PES projects require funding and succeed only when payments are sustained over a long-term 
(TEEB, 2010). There are several different financing schemes but typically they are defined into two 
categories: user-financed or government-financed projects. Funds for the payments can be collected 
by voluntary contributions, monthly salary contributions, annual fees, endowment funds, additional 
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shares of water charges, watershed protection fees from industries, certificates for environmental 
services and ecological sales taxes (TEEB, 2010). 
The main advantage of government-financed projects is economies of scale which means that all the 
costs can be spread to a larger number of agents, but then an important disadvantage is inefficiency 
which occurs when government is not the direct user of the ES and the project may be swayed by 
political interests (Blackman & Woodward, 2010). Yet government-financed PES programs can be 
more cost-effective than user-financed for the same reason of economies of scale (Engel et al., 
2008). The other form of financing is user-financing in which the one who benefits from the ES 
pays to the one who can provide the improved environmental quality. According to Engel et al. 
(2008) the key distinction between user- and government-financed programs is not in who pays the 
bills but in who has the authority to decide about paying.  
When the number of buyers increases also the transaction costs and the incentives to free ride 
increase (Engel et al. 2008). Transaction costs may be seen as a barrier to participation in PES 
schemes (Blackman & Woodward, 2010) and for this reason trust fund scheme based financing can 
be a competitive form of finance, at least in some cases.  
Effectiveness and other considerations 
In their meta-analysis Brouwer, Tesfaye and Pauw (2011) studied the causal relationship between 
the institutional design and the environmental performance of 47 PWS schemes around the world. 
They found that the terms and conditions of the scheme participation, like the selection of service 
providers, existence of quantifiable objectives, community participation and the number of 
intermediaries, affected the environmental achievement of the PWS programs. For example, 
number of intermediaries and voluntary participation in the programs had negative effect on 
meeting the environmental objectives whereas programs in the community level rather than in the 
individual level with cash payments showed positive effects on the environment. (Brouwer, 
Tesfaye, & Pauw, 2011) 
In spite of the interest in payment schemes to promote changes in natural capital, few ex-post 
assessments of the impacts of the schemes on service provision and participants’ livelihoods etc. 
have been conducted. One example of such evaluation can be found from China. PWS program in 
The Miyun Reservoir near Beijing, has improved the water quality and quantity downstream by 
changing the upstream land use from rice to corn cultivation. Farmers’ average income in the 
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upstream townships is about one-third of those in downstream and the upstream farmers would 
change back to rice cultivation if the payments were to stop. (Zheng, et al., 2013).  
Brouwer et al. (2011) found that payments by downstream hydropower companies to upstream 
landowners for reduced sediment loads are an example of a successful PWS scheme. Based on these 
cases and with reference to Moyobamba (Quintero, Wunder, & Estrada, 2009) it seems that one 
reason for the success of the PWS schemes is that when downstream has greater income and thus 
liquidity to pay for the ecosystem service. 
One issue to consider is how to build the PES program so that there is mutual confidence between 
the ES buyer and the seller (MEA, 2005). In Los Negros Bolivia, the key constraint was found to be 
lack of confidence on both sides’ compliance and the monitoring of compliance eventually focused 
on revisits to the contracted land areas (Asquith, Vargas, & Wunder, 2008). Most of the reviewed 
PWS schemes by Porras et al. (2008) monitor the contract performance by visual inspection of land 
use rather than monitoring or measuring the amount of the produced environmental service. 
According to Bulte et al. (2008) it is difficult to achieve two objectives, for example poverty 
reduction and environmental performance, with one payment scheme, at least efficiently. Raben 
(2007) states that “PES is first and foremost an environmental management tool”.  In Jequetepeque 
watershed, Peru, pro-poor impacts of PES scheme are questionable because the poorest do not hold 
water licenses and hence cannot be targeted as providers in the scheme. (Raben, 2007). In addition, 
Kosoy et al. (2007) found that trade-offs between the environmental and the social goals are likely 
to emerge, which poses some doubts to PES being a multipurpose instrument. For these reasons it is 
important to take the context into account and also to keep the program design as simple as 
possible. In addition to keeping program design simple, current water rights and management 
practices should be scrutinized thoroughly before implementing a PWS scheme.  
2.3. Irrigation needs and behavior 
Water demand for irrigation is derived demand that evolves from the value of produced agricultural 
products. Supply of water on the other hand has stochastic elements (precipitation etc.) but occurs 
in an average expected amount that can be projected based on the climatological averages. When 
modeling irrigation behavior, two terms need to be distinguished.  Effective water is the amount of 
water that is actually utilized by plants and applied water is the amount of water that is used and 
applied to the field. Another important term is irrigation efficiency and that is defined as the ratio of 
effective water to applied water. (Boggess, Lacewell, & Zilberman, 1993).  
18 
 
Typical irrigation efficiency of traditional gravitation methods is about 0.6 (60 %) whereas for more 
modern technologies like drip or sprinkler irrigation methods it can be up to 0.95 (95 %) 
(Hanemann et al. 1987 in Boggess et al. 1993). In vicinity of Santiago, central Chile, irrigation 
efficiency varies between 20 to 60 %, depending on the local conditions (Anton, 1993) and 
according to a model results in Maipo river, Chile, irrigation efficiency is 40.4 % whereas experts’ 
estimation for the area is 45 % (Rosegrant, Ringler, McKinney, Cai, Keller, & Donoso, 2000). 
Similar value applies in Chancay-Huaral basin, Peru, where the efficiency of agricultural water use 
is estimated to be 40 % (Typsa Group, 2013, p. 34). Hence majority of the water applied to fields is 
actually wasted and does not reach the plants due to losses in the irrigation system. 
What factors have an influence on water availability in a certain site? In addition to water 
abstractive human activities there are a great number of physical processes behind formation of 
water. Climate variables such as temperature, precipitation and evapotranspiration have an impact 
on water budget in an area. According to Allen (2013), the water budget is as follows:  
(1) 
ETGWQGWQPS outoutinin   
where S  represents the change in water storage, P is precipitation, Q  is runoff or discharge in or 
out, GW is groundwater in or out and ET is evapotranspiration out. Long term water budget 
contracts to: ETQP  . 
Evapotranspiration (ET) is combination of two processes leading to loss of water. Water evaporates 
from soil surface and transpires from crops. ET is affected by weather parameters and crop factors 
as well as management and environmental conditions. Crop water requirement is the amount that is 
needed to compensate the loss from ET. Thus the values for crop water requirement and ET are 
identical even though crop water requirement refers to water need and ET to water loss. Further, 
irrigation water requirement is crop water requirement less effective precipitation.  (Allen, Pereira, 
Raes, & Smith, 1998).  
FAO Penman-Monteith equation that is introduced in Allen et al. (1998) is a method that is used to 
determine crop water requirements (or effective water amount). It provides ET from hypothetical 
grass reference surface and provides a standard to which ET from other crops can be related. The 
Penman-Monteith equation is as follows: 
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where ETo is reference evapotranspiration [mm day
-1
], Rn net radiation at the crop surface [MJ m
-2
 
day
-1
], G is soil heat flux density [MJ m
-2
 day
-1
], T is mean daily air temperature at 2 m height [°C], 
u2 is wind speed at 2 m height [m s
-1
], es is saturation vapor pressure [kPa], ea is actual vapor 
pressure [kPa], es - ea is saturation vapor pressure deficit [kPa],   is slope vapor pressure curve 
[kPa °C
-1
] and   is psychometric constant [kPa °C-1]. (Allen et al. 1998). 
Hargreaves and Samani (1985) introduce a simpler method for estimating reference crop 
evapotranspiration, which relies on temperature data alone: 
(3) minmax0 *)8,17(**0023,0 TTTRET avga    
where aR is extraterrestrial solar radiation (mm/d) and T stands for average, minimum and 
maximum temperatures (C°). This can be used when facing climate data limitations.  
Crop cultivation is a dynamic process and the agricultural water need depends on both ET and crop 
growth stage at a point in time; typically plants need more water in the middle of their growth and 
less in the beginning and end (Table 5). When 0ET  for a region is known, the maximum ET or cET
(water requirement) for any given crop can be calculated as 
(4) 0*ETKET cc    
where cK  is the crop coefficient (Allen et al. 1998). Crop coefficients for different crops and 
climatic areas are provided in Allen et al. (1998, Chapter 6). 
Hence the irrigation need is a sum of many dynamic factors of which previous were just examples 
of. The farmer needs to weigh climatological factors and knowledge about crop growth when doing 
the irrigation plan. The actual water requirement of a patch of land at a certain point in time is 
difficult to determine. However, some rough estimates of water need of total growth period of a 
crop can be found from literature.  
Farmers typically apply too much water and use water less productively when trying to maximize 
yields. Improvements in crop production can be done only at farm level. Relationship between 
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water input and yield shows that there needs to be a greater emphasis on water productivity in the 
water management. (Molden, Murray-Rust, Sakthivadivel, & Makin, 2003). Agricultural sector is 
more affected to drought than municipal sector. Yet changes in irrigation technology costs do not 
affect agricultural water withdrawals easily and the profits from irrigation vary only little with 
changes in technology costs. Also, changes in crop prices have only small effects on irrigation 
water withdrawals but great impact on profits from irrigation. (Rosegrant, Ringler, McKinney, Cai, 
Keller, & Donoso, 2000). The main factor influencing both agricultural water demand and demand 
for drainage is water price (Caswell, Lichtenberg, & Zilberman, 1990).  
As seen in Figure 2, water-yield relationship is typically s-shaped and concave (middle grey curve). 
Marginal product curve (lightest grey) shows that there is a point where marginal product starts to 
decrease when water application continues. Yield cannot be increased by increasing input use 
forever.  
 
Figure 2. Theoretical relationship between yield and water, and water productivity. (Molden 
et al. 2003). 
Water is an input to the agricultural production process, as are fertilizers, labor, land area and 
machinery etc. Also land or soil quality and cropping pattern have an effect in the final output. 
Irrigation technology, on the other hand, has an impact to the level of input use. Yet water 
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availability along with market situation is found to be determining factor for the choice of crop and 
also for the irrigation strategies in Peru (Swiech et al., 2012). Land quality is a vector of different 
attributes like fertility, water-holding capacity, topography and depth of topsoil that affects the 
productivity of land. It is main determinant of cropping pattern in absence of irrigation and land 
areas allocated to different crops vary over different land qualities. (Lichtenberg, 1989). Cropping 
pattern or the choice of different outputs is an important variable in farmers’ strategic decision 
making and therefore it would be beneficial to be incorporated in the modeling of the payment. 
Different crops have different outputs per hectare as well as prices which means different profits. 
Soil quality on the other hand defines the profitability of the plants grown in the field. 
Soil is a dynamic system that stores water and acts as a buffer against dehydration of agricultural 
crops. Soil characteristics like slope, texture, salinity, nutrient content and depth determine the 
availability of soil water to the plants and are summarized by the term “water holding capacity”. 
Water holding capacity of the soil and the method of water application determine the effectiveness 
of irrigation. An increase in the land quality will increase the optimal amount of effective water but 
not necessarily the actual amount of applied water since the level of water effectiveness is typically 
higher for better qualities of land. Marginal productivity of effective water measures how 
responsive the crop is for irrigation. High marginal productivity and increase in land quality 
supposedly lead to reduction in water use and opposite applies for low marginal productivity areas. 
Modern irrigation technology is typically used with low land quality and expensive water whereas 
traditional technology is used in heavy and leveled soils and low water price. (Caswell & 
Zilberman, 1986). 
Increasing irrigation efficiency may be one way to reach the increased downstream water 
availability. In their analysis, Boggess et al. (1993, 325-326) show that in theory there is a small 
difference in the effective water use in modern (effective) technology compared to traditional 
(ineffective) one. Thus transitioning to modern technology has only a small effect on the yield. Yet 
substantial savings in amount of applied water can be achieved by adapting new technology. 
(Boggess et al. 1993). Precision technology is a technology that can potentially reduce input-use. It 
has three technical effects: precision-effect, productivity-effect and pollution-effect. Precision-effect 
reduces the input-output ratio and increases the efficiency of input use. Productivity-effect raises the 
marginal productivity of the input by changing the conditions where the precision technology is 
applied. Finally, the pollution-effect reduces pollution. (Khanna & Zilberman, 1997). Overall, land 
quality-augmenting technologies, like improved irrigation technology, tend to be adopted on lower 
qualities of land (Lichtenberg, 1989). 
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Land quality-augmenting practices are seen as a key factor in increasing agricultural efficiency 
(Caswell & Zilberman, 1986). The main source of inefficiency in production is the low utilization 
of inputs in the production process. Residuals from inputs like irrigation water are a major source of 
environmental problems. However, it is not only the technology that affects this but also the 
heterogeneous production conditions cause varying problems. (Khanna & Zilberman, 1997).  
However, opposed to Caswell and Zilberman (1986), it is important to acknowledge that increased 
irrigation efficiency might also have reverse effects on the water availability. Millennium 
Assessment Report (MEA, 2005) states that improvements in irrigation efficiency are important in 
terms of water productivity but they are not sufficient to meet the environmental  needs or goals 
since in water scarce areas increased irrigation efficiency might lead to even increased production 
and intensity of irrigation. In other words, increased irrigation efficiency upstream might backfire 
the initial purpose of increasing the amount of ecosystem service in downstream when the upstream 
farmers realize that now they have more water and they can expand their production and produce 
more with the same amount of water as before the technology improvement. According to 
Lichtenberg (1989), spread of center pivot irrigation technology happens in lower quality lands e.g. 
sandy soils that are prone to erosion and groundwater contamination. Therefore adopting irrigation 
technology might also have other reverse environmental effects such as erosion.  
However, Khanna (1995, original paper not available) argues that when the adoption of new 
technology increases input-use, it may reduce pollution per unit of land if pollution-effect is large 
enough. Still, the adoption reduces pollution-output ratio, albeit it may theoretically increase 
pollution per unit of land area. (Khanna & Zilberman, 1997). Khanna and Zilberman (1997) argue 
that it might be rational choice of profit maximizing micro units not to adopt new technology 
because they are heterogeneous and gains and losses from the investment vary across them. They 
also argue that because existing market imperfections (in input and output markets etc.) reduce 
incremental benefit from the adoption, rational choice could be not to adopt new technology.  
2.4. Municipal water use and demand 
Population centers require residential water through municipal and private water supply systems. 
Municipalities demand for constant drinking water supply throughout the year. There is also 
demand for improved water quality that would reduce the treatment costs of the municipal water 
supply systems. Also reduced flood risks and water shortages are of interest. (Porras, Grieg-Gran, & 
Neves, 2008). Other residential water uses includes sanitation, drinking, cooking, gardening and 
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washing of cars and driveways. Outside uses may account for a major proportion of water demand 
in arid areas. Residential use of water is final consumption good and therefore consumer demand 
theory provides the basis for determining the total demand. (Booker, Howitt, Michelsen, & Young, 
2012). Hanemann (1998) refers to urban water use as a synonym for municipal and industrial 
(M&I) use that consists of residential, industrial, commercial and public uses, and also some other 
minor water use purposes. Residential water demand depends on, inter alia, population size, level of 
sanitation (toilet facilities) and other water needy appliances, cooking activities and so on. 
Improved living standards in general increase the demand for fresh water services (George, Malano, 
Davidson, Hellegers, Bharati, & Massuel, 2011). 
Treated drinking water that is delivered to customers is quite a different quality product than the 
water withdrawn at the source point. Capturing, storing, treatment and delivery system require 
significant inputs for infrastructure from the municipal water service. Especially when evaluating 
reallocation of water between rural and urban uses the benefits from both activities need to be 
commensurable and the most convenient way to value them is in terms of raw water. In situations 
when water use is not metered stated preference methods are adopted in order to find out the 
willingness to pay for municipal water. (Booker, Howitt, Michelsen, & Young, 2012). 
Consumer demand for water can be determined either by water requirement approach or economic 
approach. Former incorporates population and its growth estimates within the water delivery area 
and latter treats water use as behavioral phenomenon that reflects consumer demand function 
derived from actual data. (Hanemann W. M., 1998). For example George et al. (2011) used the 
former method that is based on population, its average growth rate and per capita water demand to 
estimate the total urban demand for water. On contrary, Rosegrant et al. (2000) derive the demand 
from water utility’s perspective. They consider that the water utility is an economic agent that 
maximizes its profits and supplies residents with water. 
When the basic water needs are met, it is probably potable water price that impacts the drinking 
water demand. Meta-analysis by Dalhuisen et al. (2003) provide substantial evidence that water 
demand is price inelastic, their sample mean being -0.41, median -0.35 and standard deviation 0.86. 
They also found that demand is inelastic with respect to changes in income, mean being 0.43, 
median 0.24 and standard deviation 0.79. Yet they conclude that the residential water demand is 
relatively price-elastic and that price and income elasticities are significantly greater in high income 
areas, which is in contradiction with the previous statement. George et al. (2011) assumed own-
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price elasticity of -0.17 and found that gross benefits and net present value are very sensitive to 
price elasticity: the more inelastic price is assumed the smaller are the benefits obtained. 
Population growth and urbanization drive up the demand for drinking water in any inhabited area. 
Areas must develop but some development trends stress water resources more than others. When 
the income level of urban population increases, they can afford to upgrade their living standards. 
Upgraded living standards imply increased amount of household appliances and more careless use 
of water, which implies increased fresh water demand. To some extent water price may restrain 
ample water withdrawals but if the water price is too high, development might stall and cause social 
turmoil.  
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3. Case area and data 
This chapter presents the study area of Chancay-Huaral basin. An overall view on the 
characteristics of the basin is provided and the Peruvian water management practices and policy are 
described. Also the local features that are important in terms of PWS program design are discussed. 
3.1. Setting the scene 
The study area is Chancay-Huaral basin (see Figure 3) that is located in coastal Peru, about 80 km 
north from the capital, Lima. Peru is an emerging country with quite a patchy water management 
system. Since agriculture is the greatest user of water and uses about 85% of consumed water (in 
2000) (FAO, 2013), the analysis of the suitability of payments for watershed services for Peruvian 
watersheds is highly linked to irrigation. Irrigation practices in Peru are rather traditional and the 
level of area equipped for irrigation is quite low. Traditional irrigation methods like flood irrigation 
e.g. surface irrigation are water consuming and significant amount of water is lost because there is a 
limit beyond which crops cannot absorb the water for their advantage. Peru has a land area of 128 
million hectares of which 16.8 % (21.5 million ha) is agricultural land with only 1196000 hectares 
equipped for irrigation (FAO, 2013). Distribution of water is determined annually by campaigning. 
In 2000 agricultural withdrawals accounted for 16420.5 million m
3
 of water (FAO 2013).  
 
Figure 3. Location of study site. Picture from Estudio de caso: El Sistema de Información 
Agraria – Valle de Huaral, Perú. Reducir la Brecha Digital. En El Medio Rural. (FAO, 2006). 
Chancay-Huaral basin has acreage of 3480.87 km
2
 of which around 22000
2
 hectares (220 km
2
) is 
under irrigation. The climate changes from arid and semi-warm in the coast to rainy and cold when 
moving towards inland and mountains. In 2007 the total population in the basin was approximately 
                                                          
2
 In December 2010 24930 ha under irrigation (ANA-DCPRH, 2011, p. 20). 
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170000 inhabitants, of which 70862 inhabitants live in the largest city of the area called Huaral. The 
population in the basin is projected to grow and reach 190000 inhabitants in 2015. The main 
economic activity is agriculture that includes cultivation of industrial crops (like cotton, hard yellow 
maize and marigold), and vegetables, cereals and tubers. Among permanent crops are fruits like 
apples, avocados, oranges, mangoes and mandarins. In addition there are some mining and 
hydroelectricity production that might affect water resources in the area. The central dilemma 
concerning the use of water in the area is linked to inadequate management. Inefficient use and 
quality deterioration of water are to a great extent caused by lack of communication between sectors 
and actors and are further aggravated by insufficient economic resources and low water rating. 
Principal problems identified in Chancay-Huaral basin include inadequate water use practices 
(irrigation), deterioration of middle and lower river sections, weak compliance and implementation 
of water management instruments, and deterioration of water quality. It is acknowledged that 
agricultural areas have potential to improve both productivity and competitiveness. (Typsa Group, 
2013). 
 
Figure 4. Chancay-Huaral basin, Peru. 
27 
 
Figure 4 above is a satellite image and shows the whole watershed area in more detail. Chancay-
Huaral basin is outlined with broad white line. Thin white line shows the river beds. Greens and 
browns present bare soils whereas shades of blue present vegetation: healthy vegetation in bright 
blue and stressed vegetation is dull blue. (Credits to ESRI). 
Agriculture is by far the greatest consumptive user of water in Chancay-Huaral basin (see Table 1). 
However, municipal water demand is anticipated to increase due population growth (Typsa Group, 
2013) and cause pressure on water resource management. While there are still uncertainties relating 
to future precipitation in South-America due to variety of climate change models (Christensen, et 
al., 2013), it is assumed that Peru will face water stress in the future. Even though Peru has also its 
fair share of problems due to worsening water quality caused by pollution and nutrient loads, this 
study concentrates on the consumptive use of water and water availability rather than water quality 
issues. 
Table 1. Surface water use in Chancay-Huaral 2011-2012 (INEI, 2013). 
Consumptive use (m
3
) Non-consumptive use 
(m
3
) 
Year Total Agriculture Industrial Municipal Mining Energy 
2011 326585292 321902196 - 4572720 110376 345286432 
2012 452618328 443252136 - 9145440 220752 2600826288 
Total calculated agricultural demand of water for the Chancay-Huaral valley is annually about 
310.24 million cubic meters
 
(MCM). The acreage under irrigation accounts for 24034 ha. The peak 
agricultural demand occurs in February, 47.86 MCM, and minimum demand in July, 7.72 (MCM). 
City of Huaral demands 3.78 MCM of water. (ANA-DCPRH, 2011, p. 95). Agriculture in Huaral 
district alone demanded approximately 145 MCM in 2004-2005. 
Water management in Peru has many layers and both top-down and bottom-up features. Nation-
wise water as a resource is governed by the National Water Authority (Autoridad Nacional del 
Agua, ANA) under the Ministry of Agriculture. Under ANA there are water management 
authorities (Autoridades Administrativas del Agua, AAA) and local water administrations 
(Administraciones Locales de Agua, ALA) that conduct territorial and local water policies. ANA 
receives funds from government budget and payments from water users that use water for economic 
activities. Locally water management is operated by water user boards called Juntas de usuarios. 
Each basin has its own Junta. Junta includes the water users (irrigation committees) in the basin 
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and operates following the decisions made by its board of users. It is responsible for operation and 
maintenance of hydraulic infrastructure, water distribution and collecting water rates. All 
committees receive water from the same channel bypass (ANA-DCPRH, 2011). In Chancay-Huaral 
Junta manages 95 % of water resources in the area and consists of 17 irrigation committees (Typsa 
Group, 2013). Several (8) of these committees are located in Huaral district which is the greatest 
market place in the basin. Other two major marketplaces are Chancay and Aucallama. Junta 
performs water distribution only in low flow periods. When it is flooding, water is available freely 
for everyone. (For more precise information on agricultural water allotments in Chancay-Huaral see 
Appendix 1.) 
The agricultural water rates are set by Junta and approved by ALA. Each Junta plans their water 
need for the coming year based on cultivated crop types and area. Junta can then collect the rates 
and the annual fees that farmers pay, and use them to the activities that it is responsible for. 
Collecting efficiency of water rates was 68.2 % in 2004, which means that over 30 % of the fees 
remain unpaid due to unidentified reasons. In the Huaral valley the average agricultural water tariff 
is 114.34 soles (approximately 30€) per hectare. (ANA-DCPRH, 2011, p. 23).  
In the current water use system, water users can possess permanent water use licenses or permits, 
which give a right to use water if total available quantities exceed the needs of the license holders’ 
(Raben, 2007). Annual water amount is assessed beforehand and then non-transferable water use 
licenses that state the maximum water use based on the acreage are issued for farms.  The license is 
valid until the owner of the farm changes. The amount of arable land under irrigation is limited by 
authorities. In principal, the aggregate maximum of annual water use should equal the sum of 
maximum allowable water uses per license. 
3.2. PWS in Peruvian context 
Even though Peru is not purely a developing country, PWS scheme seems attractive because water 
management at its current state is quite ineffective and the environmental principles haven’t yet 
been established in Peruvian policies. It seems that the current system should somehow be 
strengthened. Also the emergence of new water users craves for attention. 
In Peru annual water demand for the next year is submitted to the water authority ANA by the 
Juntas in the end of the previous year.  Arranging an auction at that point could be a good way to 
allocate water in the basin scale and would also support the transition of management of water 
resources towards integrated river basin management. Yet in this study the approach is to model the 
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payment mathematically by using the production functions of upstream and downstream water 
users. 
Water use rights in Chancay-Huaral are bound to land area and this is the main tool controlling 
water use. The current water management system creates a ceiling that water withdrawals should 
not exceed. The ceiling is actually executed by setting a fixed land area that is allowed to be under 
irrigation and licenses are then issued accordingly. The purpose of the restriction of water use with 
licenses is to ensure water availability. However, the licenses are not tradable. If they were, farmers 
could trade water licenses leading to an equilibrium where those who have lesser marginal costs of 
reducing water use could gain from selling licenses, those with high costs could buy licenses and 
those who have extremely high costs would exit the industry. The current system sets a cap but does 
not allow trade. In order to cost-efficiently reach the desired environmental outcome, restrictions or 
performance standards should be tailored for each farmer individually. Tailoring is usually costly 
and requires a lot of information about farmers’ cost structures and elasticities. Because farmers 
have heterogeneous cost structure, licensing all farmers equal amount of water would lead to the 
desired water use level but not cost-efficiently and there would likely be a loss in welfare.  
Careful analysis about the market failure and its underlying causes in the supposed PES 
environment needs to be carried out before determining whether to apply PES scheme or not (Engel 
et al., 2008). In Peru agricultural sector accounts for about 85 % of water use and the number in 
Chancay-Huaral is even greater (Table 3). Unfortunately irrigation is quite ineffective and 
significant amount of water is lost during the irrigation process. This is one of the underlying causes 
for the existing market failure but also the general seasonal scarcity over the resource leads to 
overexploitation and unequal distribution of water especially in the arid coastal areas of Peru. 
Currently water is priced based on the land area and crop types and not based on the actual 
consumed volumes, which distorts the market even more. The effective price per cubic meter is 
quite low even in Peruvian standards but higher prices have potential to cause social turmoil. In 
addition, not every municipal water supply company in the Chancay-Huaral watershed area pay for 
the water they abstract (seen in Table 2) but still they may charge the customers. This is a form of 
imperfect competition since agricultural users do pay for their water use albeit the rates being void. 
Because of all aforementioned reasons it can be concluded that there is a need for an instrument that 
would direct the water use for more socially desired outcomes and do it cost-effectively. 
Some studies have been made about implementation of water management schemes in settings 
comparable to those of Chancay-Huaral. A study from Yarabamba region in Peru concerns building 
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a reservoir in upstream of the watershed and whether the reservoir will increase water availability in 
the area in general and consequently result in more yield. The study concludes that the reservoir 
might indeed alleviate water shortages but developing the current infrastructure, management and 
irrigation methods appear actually to be as influential. Also the problem of unfair water distribution 
between upstream and downstream users remains an issue regardless of building a reservoir. 
(Swiech, Ertsen, & Pererya, 2012). PWS scheme could possibly be included in those influential 
methods and help to improve the infrastructure. 
The Moyobamba case is evidence that some PWS schemes are already in place in Peru. Also other 
programs are known to be ongoing. In addition, Porras et al. (2008) collected information about 
payment for watershed service programs in developing countries and mention also few Peruvian 
schemes. These programs are diverse in design and scale but it seems that majority (in numbers) has 
the focus on water quality rather than quantity but some programs strive for bundled services.  
The greatest consumptive uses of water according to issued water rights in Chancay-Huaral are 
agriculture and municipal water use, albeit municipal use is very modest so far (see Table 2 and 
Table 3). Hence agriculture and municipal water supply system are the participants in the proposed 
PWS scheme. Table 2 lists all the sectors that use water either consumptively or non-
consumptively. It distinguishes surface water use, the issued surface water tariffs and groundwater 
use in volumes. It is noticeable that despite the fact that all sectors should operate under licenses, 
still the surface water abstraction volume is greater than surface water tariffs in 2011 in the 
municipal sector (Table 2).  
Table 2. Granted water use rights in Chancay-Huaral according sectors (Typsa Group, 2013, 
p. 26). 
 Surface water Surface water tariffs 
2011 
Groundwater 
 No. Of 
users 
Volume 
(m
3
) 
No. Of 
users 
Volume 
(m
3
) 
No. Of 
users 
Volume 
(m
3
) 
Consumptive uses 8928 275553479 8924 260416199 37 3062744 
Agriculture 8921 255733103 8921 255733103 25 2418563 
Mining 1 110376 1 110376   
Municipal 6 19710000 2 4572720 9 607345 
Industrial     3 36837 
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Non-consumptive 
use 
18 377610832 12 345286432   
Energy 18 377610832 12 345286432   
TOTAL 8946 653164311 8936 605702631 37 3062744 
Table 3 presents the share of water use per consumptive sector. Compared to the national average of 
85 % (FAO, 2013), in Chancay-Huaral agriculture accounts for almost 93 % of surface water use. 
Even the share of municipal water use is still quite modest, only 7 %. 
Table 3. Share of water rights in consumptive uses. Data source: Typsa Group, 2013. 
 Surface 
water 
Surface water 
tariffs 2011 
Groundwater 
Consumptive uses 100 % 100 % 100 % 
Agriculture 92.81 % 98.20 % 78.97 % 
Mining 0.04 % 0.04 % 0.00 % 
Municipal 7.15 % 1.76 % 19.83 % 
Industrial 0 % 0 % 1 % 
The ES in question in this study is restricted to water quantity or downstream water availability 
because the common problem in Peru is water scarcity in low flow periods and allocation of water 
between different stakeholders in general. Besides quantity, water quality is yet another great issue 
that is a typical problem in Peruvian watersheds because mining and sediment loads affect both the 
agricultural water use as well as the municipal water use, but quality is not the scope of the analysis 
in this study. Water scarcity in Peru stems from extensive and inefficient water use, emerging new 
users and arid conditions. Because agricultural irrigation is the greatest water abstracting sector 
(Table 3), water availability is also relevant when considering water and food security aspects and 
agricultural productivity and development of the country as a whole.  
Engel et al. (2008) state that if ecosystem services are club goods, which is often the case when 
water resources are concerned, the users are possible to identify and arrange the payments 
accordingly. Club goods are resources that are consumed only by the individuals that live in the 
area where the resource is located. The individuals belong to a club of users and the use of others 
outside the club can be prevented. Club goods are neither purely private nor public. (Engel, Pagiola, 
& Wunder, 2008). In the context of water abstraction in Chancay-Huaral river basin, the demanders 
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of water are agriculture that is represented by the Junta and municipal residents that are represented 
by the municipal water supply system. In theory the Junta should also include other than 
agricultural users of water but for some reason in Chancay-Huaral all municipal water companies 
do not hold licenses and belong to the Junta yet. This is probably the cause of conflicting figures in 
Table 2. The farmers belonging to the Junta have the power to influence the water quantity for the 
downstream users since the Junta first chooses its own water use (loosely based on the amount it is 
entitled to) and lets the rest flow downstream for the municipal water supply system. Thus it can be 
said that the upstream located agricultural water users or the local Junta is the provider of water 
services for the downstream water users. The total consumptive demand for water in Chancay-
Huaral sums up all farmers and municipal water needs in the area but only the agricultural users 
upstream have a direct impact on the water availability for the downstream. This leads to a situation 
where upstream-downstream PWS scheme could be feasible. 
There are several ways how the service of increased downstream water availability could be 
technically delivered in PWS schemes. One option is to restrict the amount of water that the 
upstream farmers abstract by compensating them for the extra water they let flow by. In Chancay-
Huaral, technically a ceiling for water abstraction already exists but compliance with the water 
regulation is loosely monitored.  The second option is to improve upstream land management 
practices (e.g. promote the choice of less water intensive crops, enhancing soil quality etc.). Third 
option is, for example, to improve the current irrigation technology so that more water could flow 
downstream without harming the productivity of the land. In a way this is also an improvement to 
the aforementioned land management practices. It is also typical for many PWS schemes to provide 
farmers an instruction of an alternative crop that would  better facilitate the goal of reaching the 
desired outcome of lesser water demand upstream compared to  business as usual practice.  These 
programs oblige the service providing farmers to cultivate that crop. Choice of crops is important in 
terms of farmers’ income but due to the lack of crop water requirement data from Chancay-Huaral it 
would be quite laborious task to determine which crops need less water than others and should be 
incorporated in the PWS scheme as the means for delivering the service of increased water 
availability downstream. Hence increasing irrigation efficiency seems as the most preferable option 
at this point. However, it is not essential for the development of the theoretical model to decide the 
means of service delivery after all. 
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3.3. Agrometeorological characteristics of the Chancay-Huaral basin 
Table 4 below shows the monthly discharges in Santo Domingo measuring station in Chancay-
Huaral. It shows that there is monthly and annual variation in discharge, summer and autumn are 
drier than winter and spring, and year 2004 stands out for lowest average discharge. This chart gives 
an overview on the monthly water availability in the river but it does not imply the total water 
availability in the basin. 
Table 4. Monthly discharge in Santo Domingo station. (ANA-DCPRH, 2011). 
Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Av. 
2000 22.23 49.16 44.39 23.7 14.89 8.35 6.37 5.21 4.46 7.5 5.97 19.25 17.6 
2001 41.43 38.84 97.29 44.65 14.63 8.86 7.22 5.91 5.53 5.65 11.26 12.32 24.5 
2002 11.3 30.18 53.16 36.21 11.73 7.41 5.85 5.03 4.72 6.41 13.22 13.4 16.6 
2003 33.28 45.63 80.81 29.39 11.48 6.5 5.27 5.39 5.71 5.54 4.78 14.38 20.7 
2004 10.57 27.2 19.14 14.2 5.64 3.97 3.42 3.57 3.63 5.16 13.62 24.48 11.2 
2005 27.99 14.58 37.32 32.44 7.67 5.42 4.95 5.19 5.56 5.44 5.81 8.77 13.4 
2006 12.33 37.55 49.73 37.53 9.52 6.29 5.56 5.66 6.2 6.32 7.28 17.1 16.8 
2007 41.69 32.39 50.26 49.49 13.01 7.92 5.89 6.24 6.62 7.05 7.93 8.37 19.7 
2008 24.09 34.68 30.37 21.07 7.7 6 5.72 5.73 5.29 6.46 6.57 8.26 13.5 
2009 28.16 62.08 51.18 43.57 16.8 9.39 9.91 6.87 7.14 8.88 9.16   23.0 
Av. 22.8 38.4 48.5 24.7 10.3 6.8 5.5 5.0 5.0 5.6 7.4 12.2 16.0 
Figure 5 illustrates the reference ET for the Chancay-Huaral study area. The ET is calculated with 
Penman-Monteith method (Equation (2)), because the climate dataset obtained from the area 
determines all the relevant variables and constants but the solar radiation, which is substituted with 
reference radiation data from Rome. Climate data is collected by SENAMHI from Donoso 
measurement station that is located near the city of Huaral. SENAMHI provided also an Excel 
spreadsheet with Penman-Monteith formula.  ET0 values should be referred to with caution because 
there are also other than climatological variables affecting the water requirement.  For example crop 
type and the development stage of the crop highly contribute to the effective water need. Yet the 
values are approximate and suggest that water requirements are highest in December-April and 
lowest in June-August due to climatological conditions.  
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Figure 5. Reference evapotranspiration calculated with Penman-Monteith method. Climate 
data is from a measurement station in Donoso, near city of Huaral. 
Crop requires different amount of water depending on the growth stage. The growth stage 
dependent values for crop coefficients for typical crops in Chancay-Huaral are provided in Table 5. 
With equation (4), the physical water requirements could be determined. However, the lengths of 
each growth stages are site specific and depend on climatological conditions. Information about the 
lengths of growth stages in Peru is not available and hence the total water requirement is difficult to 
determine with this method. 
Table 5. Crop coefficients for typical crops in Chancay-Huaral. Values adopted from Allen et 
al. 1998. 
Spanish name Plant Kc initial Kc middle Kc end 
Algodon Cotton 0.35 1.15-1.20 0.70-0.50 
Maiz amarillo 
duro 
Hard yellow 
maize 
0.3 1.2 0.6-0.35 
Mandarina Mandarin 0.5-0.7 0.45-0.65 0.55-0.7 
Manzana Apple 0.6 0.95 0.75 
Palta Avocado 0.6 0.85 0.75 
Papa Potato 0.5 1.15 0.754 
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Table 6 shows the typical sowing schedule in Peru for few major crops. Some crops are sown year 
round but cotton is typically not sown in spring. Other crops than cotton are sowed quite evenly 
every month but cotton sowing takes place mostly in autumn. In addition to sowing time, the exact 
growth pattern of growth stages has an impact on total irrigation need of the crop. 
Table 6. Agricultural calendar for sowing, numbers are percentage (%) of all sowings. 
(MINAG, 2013). 
Crop/Month Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
Cotton 5.5         0.6 3.0 11.3 32.2 30.8 13.7 2.9 
Sweet potato 7.8 8.0 9.0 10.1 10.5 9.2 7.5 7.8 6.8 7.4 7.1 8.8 
Hard yellow maize 7.8 11.3 9.3 9.5 8.7 9.3 8.2 7.1 5.8 7.5 7.5 8.0 
Potato 2.0 0.8 0.9 4.6 7.8 13.2 13.7 18.7 9.5 11.8 11.2 5.8 
Tomato 7.9 8.4 7.6 9.3 9.6 9.0 9.0 7.9 7.5 8.7 8.3 6.8 
Peruvian coast is quite desert-like and bleak, and its soil is mainly sandy or loamy-sand that has 
very loose structure (Vera, 2000). For example cotton can be grown in silt loam and sandy loam 
soils (MINAG, 2013). According to Peruvian Ministry of Agriculture, nationally important crops 
are coffee, potato, rice, cotton, asparagus, sugar and maize (MINAG, 2013). From these crops 
Typsa Group (2013) lists cotton and maize to be industrially important in Chancay-Huaral basin and 
also some tubers and vegetables to have significant importance. 
In the Table 7 below, the representative monthly crops and acreages based on sowing intentions in 
2004-2005 are presented for the whole Chancay-Huaral basin. This sowing intention table has been 
the basis for agricultural water allocation in later years as well. The table shows that largest areas in 
Chancay-Huaral are allocated for maize and cotton, which supports choosing them as representative 
crops. 
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Table 7. A representative crop identification card based on sowing intention statements in 
2004-2005 (sowing intention in hectares). (ANA-DCPRH, 2011, p. 23). 
 Hectares/Month  
Crop  AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL Total 
Maize 454 827 1693 2987 4922 6092 5915 5151 3919 1985 361 164 6906 
Cotton 2316 4809 5600 5600 5600 5600 5600 5600 5600 5600 3284 792 5600 
Mandarin 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 
Avocado 1257 1257 1257 1257 1257 1257 1257 1257 1257 1257 1257 1257 1257 
Apple 1013 1013 1013 1013 1013 1013 1013 1013 1013 1013 1013 1013 1013 
Sweet potato 234 304 357 459 559 801 678 675 550 537 437 196 997 
Peach 896 896 896 896 896 896 896 896 896 896 896 896 896 
Mango 809 809 809 809 809 809 809 809 809 809 809 809 809 
Maize husk 135 168 194 297 162 214 188 124 353 267 267 229 649 
Potato 115 135 135 135 135 29 19 53 175 391 382 386 540 
Maize choclo 110 110 110 110   4 4 96 142 204 204 122 318 
Lucumo 244 244 244 244 244 244 244 244 244 244 244 244 245 
Kidney bean     2 5 66 148 208 147 62       213 
Carrot 16 16 16 16 16     41 153 194 194 194 210 
Grapevine 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 
Orange 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 
Flowers 117 117 117 117   11 37 37 37 26     154 
Tomato 25 34 46 41 87 105 91 107 103 64 16 16 146 
Gherkin 28 28 58 32 69 40 37 42 42 42     145 
Strawberries 105 105 105 118 14 14 14 13 13 13 13   131 
Chili 10 42 56 80 101 101 91 64 50 25 5 5 106 
Cauliflower   7 7 7 15 38 78 78 86 56 15 15 101 
Lima beans 3 3 34 34 31 34 3 34 34 31 31   68 
Pepper 6 17 17 20 32 36 25 25 23 10     44 
Onion   14 14 14             14 14 28 
Natural grass 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 
Pumpkin 15 15 15                   15 
Pangola grass 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Bean 1 1 1 1                 1 
TOTAL 11350 14413 16238 17735 19471 20928 20651 19949 19002 17106 12885 9793 2403
4 
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However, when looking at other dataset that is from the city of Huaral, the spatial differences within 
the basin can be well noticed. For example avocados and mandarins account for quite large acreages 
whereas cotton has significantly smaller area in Huaral (Table 8). In terms of produced amounts 
(tons) in 2011 the production of maize, mandarins and potatoes were greatest (Table 8) but naturally 
comparing just the amounts is not a good criteria for choosing the crops used in this study. Largest 
acreage is allocated to maize and second largest to mandarin. Due to the national and local 
importance of maize, it is chosen as the first crop. Regardless of the fact that cotton is not as 
important in Huaral as it is in the basin generally, it is chosen to be the second crop. This is because 
cotton has national importance and local importance in the basin albeit not in Huaral.  
Table 8. Production amounts, average prices and acreages for important crops in Huaral 
2011, few examples. 
Crop Average 
production 
(ton/ha) 
Average price 
(S/./kg) 
Acreage (ha) 
Apple 13.7 0.7 1062 
Avocado 10.4 2.1 905 
Cotton 2.8 2.9 412 
Hard yellow 
maize 
8.2 1.0 1867 
Maize husk 40.8 0.1 1315 
Mandarin 26.9 1.1 1794 
Potato 23.6 0.6 1002 
In general cotton (Gossypium Barbadense) is more tolerant to water deficit than maize (Zea Mays 
L.) meaning that reduced water use exhibits less than proportional reduction in yield for cotton 
compared to maize. Due to this quality, cotton is typical crop in water scarce areas or in areas where 
irrigation is restricted because of economic reasons. Cotton is a cash crop usually grown as 
monoculture. It requires approximately 600-1200 mm of water but the ET varies in range 410-780 
mm per season. Maize is globally important grain. Humans consume maize seeds and the seeds are 
also main component in animal feed. Maize is frequently grown in rotation with winter cereals or 
grain legumes like beans. The seasonal ET for maize varies 500-800 mm depending on the climate 
conditions etc. (Steduto, Hsiao, Fereres, & Raes, 2012).  
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3.4. Characteristics of municipal water supply system in Chancay-Huaral basin 
Municipal water use in Chancay-Huaral accounts only for small proportion of total water use (Table 
3). Residential water use e.g. drinking and sanitation water are regarded as municipal water demand 
in this study. There are total of three water supply companies in the basin: EPS Aucallama, EMAPA 
Chancay and EMAPA Huaral. EMAPA Huaral provides water to the biggest municipality and is the 
only company that provides data in public. For these reasons it will be considered as the demander 
of watershed services. Residential and commercial water demands can usually be distinguished 
because of improved municipal record keeping and measuring activities (Booker et al. 2012). Yet in 
Huaral the local water company EMAPA Huaral has meters only in 39.15 % of its connections 
(EMAPA Huaral S.A., 2012). Therefore it is difficult to distinguish the different purposes and users 
of total municipal water demand. 
Water delivery infrastructure is costly and hence competition in local retail water market isn’t 
usually viable (Griffin, 2006, p. 14). Thus it is typical that water companies have monopoly status 
within their operative area. EMAPA Huaral is one of the potable water and sewerage providers in 
the area of Chancay-Huaral watershed but a single provider in city of Huaral. There has been 
significant increases in both sewer and potable water coverage in Huaral in the past years. Coverage 
for sewers was 71.9 % and for potable water 78.9 % in 2007. In 2012 potable water coverage was 
95.7 % providing drinking water to 77090 habitants. For sewerage the coverage was 94.4 %. 
(EMAPA Huaral S.A., 2012).  
Some annual statistics for the municipal water supply system in Huaral are shown in Table 9. It can 
be seen, for example, that EMAPA Huaral seems to increase the prices on annual basis. In 2011 
medium water rate was 1.63 S/. per cubic meter and average operative cost 1.29 S/. whereas in 2012 
the tariff was 1. 68 S/. and operative cost 1.65 S/.. In 2011 the produced volume of 5896402 m
3
 was 
delivered through 13421 connections with only 3246436 m
3
 being billed, meaning that 44.90 % of 
water was unbilled. Some improvements were obtained in 2012 when EMAPA Huaral delivered 
5960309 m
3
 of water through 15418 connections and billed for 3411529 m
3
 which means that 42.8 
% of delivered water was still unpaid. The company has obtained positive profits for two 
consecutive years: 332869 S/. in 2011 and 38282 S/. in 2012. However, not all of this is pure profit 
since the company owes significant debt to external third parties like KfW (German Development 
Bank). (EMAPA Huaral S.A., 2012). 
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Table 9. Municipal water delivery data (EMAPA Huaral S.A., 2012, pp. 18-24) 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Delivered water (m
3
) 5855885 6003508 5929381 5813003 5896402 5960309 
Billed water (m
3
) 2999608 3054184 3198692 3171413 3246436 3411529 
Unbilled water (%) 48.78 49.10 46.10 45.40 44.90 42.80 
Price (S/./m
3
) 0.89 0.93 1.04 1.37 1.63 1.68 
Operative cost (S/./m
3
) 0.98 0.101 0.97 1.07 1.29 1.65 
The share of unbilled water shows the typical dilemma in developing or emerging countries: 
demand exceeds the actual ability to pay but providing water to residents is still important in terms 
of development, albeit not being profitable for the company from commercial perspective. 
According to World Water Assessment Program (WWAP), it is suggested by the UN that in order 
to fulfil the basic needs for drinking, cooking and cleaning each person would need 20-50 liters of 
water a day (UN-Water, 2013). On the contrary, EMAPA Huaral delivers 214.8 liters of water per 
habitant per day (EMAPA Huaral S.A., 2012). This means that the water service in Huaral is 
already sufficient in meeting the minimum standards of basic water demand. Hence other factors 
than mere biological water need might have great influence on the municipal water demand. For 
example the population growth is estimated to increase annual municipal water demand from 15.52 
million cubic meters in 2007 to 17.38 million cubic meters in 2015, whereas demand for irrigation 
water in the basin is annually about 310.24 million cubic meters (Typsa Group, 2013, pp. 23-24). 
As the urban population grows, also the economic development changes the consumption habits of 
this growing population towards more water consuming. Together all these changes drive the 
municipal water demand further up. 
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4. The Model 
This chapter introduces the hydro-economic model. First the profit maximization functions for the 
Junta and the municipal water supply system are defined. Then private and social optima for the 
water use are determined accordingly. Finally the mechanisms that obtain the social optimum in the 
Chancay-Huaral river basin are introduced. Developing this kind of model would help possible 
PWS program designers in similar settings in determining economically sufficient and sustainable 
payment. 
Hydro-economic models are typically developed as constrained optimization problems. Objective 
function includes economic measures of the benefits and costs of water use whereas hydrological 
and institutional factors are represented as constraints. (Booker et al. 2012). Figure 6 shows a 
typical conceptual structure for the hydro-economic model. The framework is modified from 
Booker and allies’ (2012) conceptual structure map. Total demand includes derived demands for 
both agricultural and municipal water. Industrial water demand is left out of the analysis. 
Hydrological conditions create the supply of water and that is also a constraint to all water uses. The 
model combines demand and supply and finds equilibrium for economic activities and water use. 
Policy instruments are introduced in order to achieve the desired socially optimal equilibrium and to 
determine sufficient payments.  
 
Figure 6. Conceptual structure of hydro-economic model (modified from Booker et al. 2012) 
Hydroeconomic 
model 
Demand 
Agricultural 
demand 
Municipal 
demand 
Supply 
Hydrological 
conditions 
Policy 
instruments 
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Rosegrant et al. (2000) state that “increasing competition for water across sectors increases the 
importance of the river basin as the appropriate unit of analysis to address the challenges facing 
water resources management; and modeling at this scale can provide essential information for 
policymakers in their resource allocation decisions”. Therefore, the hydro-economic model 
developed in this thesis looks at the water use in one basin. 
In order to make the numerical testing of the model simple, few simplifying presumptions based on 
previous analysis have to be made: 
- there are only one Junta and one municipal water supply system operator in the watershed, 
Junta located upstream and the municipal water supply system downstream of the river 
basin. It is assumed that agricultural and municipal users are separate decision-making units. 
- Junta consists of farmers but it is assumed to be a single decision-making unit and its 
production function for agriculture is concave and aggregate for the area.  
- There are two crops that can be grown. The land allocation depends on how the crops 
manage in different land qualities and how profitable they are. 
- All prices are exogenous to the model. 
The hypothesis is that extensive agricultural water abstraction upstream may cause scarcity of water 
to the downstream user, which can cause a loss in social welfare for the river basin altogether. In 
case of ample use of water upstream, a reduction in upstream output and water use could enable 
larger increase in downstream municipal water service. Hence there is a need for an instrument that 
would direct water use to a more socially desired allocation. Implementing a PWS scheme is an 
example of that kind of an instrument.  
Figure 7 presents the framework for the model. Junta’s agricultural land along the river is divided 
into parcels that are reserved for two different crops. In open access situation the upper located 
Junta can abstract as much as it pleases leaving too little to the downstream municipal water supply 
system. This is because agricultural water use has advantage due to the upstream location and weak 
enforcement of equal property or water use rights. In open access situation the municipal water 
supply system has to adapt to being the follower. Therefore downstream water use might be 
affected by ample upstream water use. This may cause inefficiency in water allocation and loss of 
welfare in the watershed when there is conflicting water use interests. Whether there is enough 
water for both users depends on resource availability. If there is enough water for maximization of 
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both agricultural and municipal profits, open access yields economically best result. Yet this might 
lead to environmentally harmful water withdrawal levels that are not socially desired.  
 
Figure 7. Framework for the model.  
The basic economic problem for each agricultural unit (being it a single farmer or Junta) and water 
supply system is to maximize its profits. Therefore the core of the model will be built on 
agricultural production function and municipal water production which equals the demand for 
drinking water. The model is solved in stages with Excel. First the privately optimal agricultural 
water application and land allocation are determined by using agricultural prices and water response 
functions as inputs. For municipal water supply system the water demand is derived with point 
expansion method. In the second stage, socially optimal water application, land allocation and the 
amount of potable water are determined by inserting a hydrological constraint to the model. The 
hydrological constraint is arbitrarily set and then the welfare maximizing shadow price is found by 
a grid search. Then these two optima are compared and subsidy is imposed on agricultural water use 
and tax on municipal water supply system’s water use. Thus the social optimum is reached with 
help of the two instruments, which is the payment scheme. 
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4.1. Open access to water and private optimum 
Agriculture 
There are several ways to interpret agricultural production. Generally used agricultural production 
functions are linear, Cobb-Douglas, quadratic, inverse and Mitscherlich functions, and their use 
depends on the available dataset (Heady & Dillon, 1988). I have identified three studies that use 
different agricultural production functions but have water as main variable. They are presented 
below. 
First, there are few studies that rely on same framework. These studies regarding irrigation behavior 
and technology choice with respect to water use support the view of using production function  
(5) 
))(*()( ijijijij qhafefy   
where ...3,2,1i is for crop type, duj , stands for location (upstream or downstream), ije  is 
effective water or crop water requirement ET, a  volume of applied water and )( ijqh water holding 
capacity or typical irrigation effectiveness/efficiency of chosen technology with certain soil quality 
q  (normalized to an index 10  q ) and technology. (Caswell and Zilberman 1986; Caswell, 
Lichtenberg and Zilberman 1990; Bogges, Lacewell and Zilberman 1993). In Caswell and 
Zilberman (1986) and Caswell et al. (1990), )( jef is chosen to be quadratic: 
2)( cebeaef j 
and cba ,, are parameters that can be defined if few yield and water requirement combinations are 
known (Caswell & Zilberman, 1986), or by defining the effective water use with the FAO method 
(Allen, Pereira, Raes, & Smith, 1998). Also, if the quality of soil is known, the effectiveness of 
irrigation can be determined, as speculated in chapter 2.3. 
In their case study, Bouma, Biggs and Bouwer (2011) model downstream externalities caused by 
upstream rainwater harvesting. They use a Cobb-Douglas production function that is as its simple 
form as follows: 
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where ...3,2,1i is for different crop types and duj , for location (upstream or downstream), A  is 
technical coefficient reflecting the production technology, e is for crop water use volume, h  for 
44 
 
cropped area and   for water intensity of agricultural production. They used the FAO Penman-
Monteith -method (Allen, Pereira, Raes, & Smith, 1998) that is based on Penman-Monteith 
evapotranspiration equation and local climate data, and calculated the optimal crop water demand. 
They assumed that when all other production requirements are met, maximum yields are sustained 
when crops are supplied with the optimal crop water requirement. (Bouma, Biggs, & Bouwer, 
2011).This implicates the private optimum for the water use. Calculating ET or crop water 
requirement values for crops used in Peru and determining the agricultural water need based on 
those numbers is one way how potential or optimal yields could be determined. Yet the quadratic 
form could be more easily determined with current data. 
Rosegrant and allies (2000), on the other hand, developed integrated economic-hydrologic model 
for Maipo river basin, Chile, by linking source nodes (rivers, reservoirs and groundwater aquifers) 
with demand nodes (irrigation fields, industrial plants and households). They delineated agricultural 
demand according to irrigation districts, where water is allocated to series of crops according to 
their water requirements and economic profitability, and used water amount, water salinity and 
irrigation technology as variables in estimating crop yield function. They assumed a curve-linear 
relationship between crop yields and seasonally applied non-saline water. The crop yield function is 
(7)     max2max10max /ln/ ETwaETwaaYY iia   
where parameters are determined by system of equations: 
cbubba
cbubba
cbubba
b
8762
541
2100



  
and aY  is the actual crop yield (metric tons/ha), maxY maximum attainable yield, 210 ,, aaa and 
80 bb   are regression coefficients, iw  infiltrated water (mm), maxET  maximum evapotranspiration 
(mm), c salt concentration in water application (dS/m), and u Christiensen Uniformity Coefficient 
(CUC, surrogating irrigation technology and management). CUC varies from 50 for flood irrigation, 
70 for furrow irrigation, 80 for sprinklers and 90 for drip irrigation. In that case, the profits from 
irrigation are:  
(8)    
pdii
aeagricultur watcfcApYAV ****   
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where A  is harvested area, i  crop type, p  crop price, fc  fixed crop cost, 
)(
0
110
uk
ktc
  
technology cost, a  water delivered (applied to the site, w price for water, 0k  the intercept of the 
technology cost function, and 
1k  cost coefficient per unit of u . Profit obtained from agricultural 
production is therefore crop revenue minus fixed crop cost, irrigation technology improvement cost 
and water supply cost. (Rosegrant, Ringler, McKinney, Cai, Keller, & Donoso, 2000). 
In their study, Caswell and Zilberman (1986) found that quadratic form fits better to the actual 
water use pattern than Cobb-Douglas. Since water is the focus of this thesis, their result supports the 
use of quadratic form in this thesis as well. Also the scarce data availability suggests use of less 
information needy function. Rosegrant and allies (2000) used water amount, water salinity and 
irrigation technology in their production function but since there is no data on water salt 
concentration from the study area, their approach can’t be replicated in this thesis.  
Consequently, it is assumed that the agricultural land is heterogeneous in quality and divided into 
parcels that reflect the quality. Each parcel is of same land quality but quality is not the same for 
every parcel. Each parcel has then different optimal water application amount and yields 
accordingly. In open access situation without any intervention or price corrections by government 
or social planner and without resource scarcity, private profit maximizing farmer makes water use 
decisions based on profit maximizing problem:  
(9) 
 jijjijj
a
ij cawyp
ij
 **max
 
with p  representing the market price for the output y  and w  representing the cost of water 
application a , c is the fixed cost of the irrigation technology and other fixed costs relating to 
production of crop j  and i  accounts for parcels. The maximization problem is different for all the 
parcels due heterogeneous land quality and farmer will make the water application decision 
separately for each parcel.  
Following the methodology in Boggess et allies (1993), effective water use is determined by 
 qhae ijij  where a  is again the applied water and  qh is the irrigation efficiency. Effective water 
is the amount of water that is utilized by the crops and therefore the amount affecting yield 
positively. Caswell and Zilberman (1986) determine yield as quadratic: 
(10) 
2
)( ijjiijjijij eeefy   . 
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The maximal yield is then determined by taking first order condition with respect to ije  
(11) 02)('  ijjijij eef  .  
With using irrigation efficiency and applied water in notation we get the final response function: 
(12) 
      22 qhaqhaqhaf ijjijijjij   . 
This leads the farmers finally to maximize the overall profits from all of the parcels ( n  implicates 
the total number of parcels): 
(13) 
     


n
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First order condition for the profit maximizing problem with respect to water use is 
(14)     02 2 


jijjjijj
ij
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waqhpqhp
a
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which implies that the value of marginal product has to equal the water price in the private 
optimum. By solving ija from the equation (14) we get 
(15) 
 
 22 qhp
wqhp
a
jj
iijjo
ij

 
  
which is the optimal water application for the specific parcel when there is open access to water. 
Profit maximizing farmer applies water until this point. If there is no scarcity or regulative policies, 
this determines the agricultural water use that is privately optimal. 
Now the farmer has to do the decision about land allocation between the two possible crops. 
Following Lichtenberg (1989), choice of profit maximizing cropping pattern is added to the profit 
function. It is assumed that land quality is normalized and ranges between 10  q
3
 and that  qG  
is the total agricultural land area that has at most land quality of q , and    qGqg ' is the land area 
                                                          
3
 Caswell, Lichtenberg and Zilberman (1990) scale the quality index q to correspond with irrigation 
effectiveness:   qqh   
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of quality q .  qg  is a continuous density function that determines how many parcels have land 
quality q . Total cultivated area is then  
(16) 
   
1
0
dqqgqG
.  
The agricultural profit function is 
(17) 
  dqqgqLqLA )())(1(*)(*max
1
0
1211  
  
where 1 and 2 stand for crop types and )(1 qL  is a share of land of quality q used to cultivate crop 1. 
The land allocation choice e.g. )(1 qL  is endogenously determined between the two crops. The final 
allocation depends on profitability of each crop in the particular land quality. Profits for each crop 
are a function of crop’s production, price and costs as presented above.  
Therefore further assumptions are in order. It is also assumed that the production functions for crops 
1 and 2 are concave in land quality and the agricultural land along the river is divided into parcels 
that reflect the land quality. Then acreage of crop 1 is calculated as 
(18) )()(
1
0
11  
q
qGdqqgA and acreage of crop 2 as    12 1 qGGA  . 
The actual privately optimal land allocation is solved by determining the point or quality of land 
where the profit curves intersect, meaning a point where 21    (Lankoski & Ollikainen, 2003). 
The agricultural problem is actually to maximize profits with respect to water withdrawals and land 
allocation: 
(19) 
     
     
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The first order conditions for this problem are: 
(20)        02 11211111
1



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(21)        02)(1 22222221
2



waqhpqhpqL
a
i
i
A 

 
(22) 
 
021
1





qL
A  
By solving each of the equations (20)-(22), the interpretations for the first order conditions can be 
derived as follows. Water is applied to parcels of crop 1 and 2 until the marginal product equals the 
water price. The applied water amount that results in maximum yield for the parcel can be 
determined as the following equations: 
 
 211
111
1
2 qhp
wqhp
a ii

 
  and 
 
 222
222
2
2 qhp
wqhp
a ii

 
 . Land 
allocation decision is made by determining the land quality that provides equal profits for both 
crops: 21   . When land quality is normalized from 0 to 1, the breaking point in land quality can 
be interpreted as total share of land allocated to crop 1. Figure 8 shows the choice of land allocation. 
The intersection of these profit curves shows that up to the intersection point  1q , crop 1 is 
cultivated since profits are higher for that crop and the rest of land is allocated for crop 2. This is 
how the farmer receives greatest profits from his land. Because the crops are different in terms of 
water need, productivity, output prices and labor costs etc. there is a solution for optimal land 
allocation between those two. 
 
Figure 8. Illustration of the choice of land allocation.  
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All prices are taken as given and are exogenous to the model and the market for agricultural 
commodities is assumed perfectly competitive. For that reason, for example changes in the market 
prices of agricultural commodities affect the cropping pattern since farmer chooses the crops that 
are the most profitable for him to cultivate. Choice of crop affects the used water amount because 
each crop has a different water requirement. Change in the water price might also change the 
outcome since it has impact on revenue accumulation.  
Municipal water 
For the municipal water companies, the economic problem is same in nature but in different 
formula. Since municipal water is actually the product that is sold onwards the demand for drinking 
water determines the production amount. It can be assumed that the process of turning raw water 
into good quality drinking water doesn’t significantly affect the amount of abstracted water. It only 
changes the quality.  
In Rosegrant and allies (2000) municipal water use and its net benefits are derived from inverse 
demand function for water, by calculating water use benefits minus water supply cost:  
(23)    awaapaaVmunicipal  12/)1/()( 000     
where 0a  (m
3
) is maximum water withdrawal/application, 0p is willingness to pay for additional 
water at full use and  is e/1 , e being price elasticity of demand and w is still the price of water. 
This approach seems unnecessary complex. 
Further, they determine total water demand in the watershed by summing empirical agronomic 
production functions and municipal (and industrial) water demand functions based on market 
inverse demand function. Hydrologic water balance with extension to the irrigated crop fields 
determines water supply. Water demand and supply is balanced based on economic benefit 
maximizing objective function: 
(24) 


demmun
municipal
demirr
eagricultur penaltywgtVVMaxObj )(  
where wgt  is the weight for penalty and penalty is defined by set of institutional rules. (Rosegrant, 
Ringler, McKinney, Cai, Keller, & Donoso, 2000). 
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More straightforward approach is used in Hautakangas & Ollikainen (2014). In this approach the 
profit function for a water supply system constitutes of revenue obtained from treating raw water 
and selling it to consumers as drinking water and from of wastewater abatement and handling. Costs 
include raw water abstraction, sewers and investments. 
(25)        )()()(,))(,(*)( IaqcIFqhpWqhpWqhp    
where W is demand for drinking water and function of water price p and )(qh tariff for wastewater 
and q is the amount of nutrients abated. )(IF  reflects the fixed payment of investments in 
connections and  raw water abstraction costs that is a function of water demand. )(qc is abatement 
cost from abating nutrients and )(Ia is average cost of sewers. 
Profit maximizing municipal water supply system responds to residential water demand that is 
utility driven and affected by drinking water price. By adjusting the profit function presented in 
Hautakangas & Ollikainen (2014) a profit function for the water supply system is obtained as 
follows: 
(26)         pQcpQwpQp MMM ˆˆˆˆmax  
where  pQ ˆ  is the derived consumer demand for drinking water and thus also the  abstracted water 
amount. Price that the water supply system operator gets for selling and distributing drinking water 
is pˆ   whereas 
Mw  is the unit price for raw water abstraction from river, Mc is the operative cost of 
delivering the water and   is fixed cost for water purifying activities and other relevant processes. 
The necessary condition for the municipal water supply system is 
(27) 
 
0ˆ
ˆ


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MM
M cwp
pQ

 
which yields 
(28) MM cwp ˆ  
The condition implies that municipal water supply system withdraws water from the river to the 
point where the marginal costs of providing water equal the price of drinking water it receives from 
the customers.  
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Demand for drinking water is assumed to be linear and decreasing with price increase. Hence the 
amount of demanded drinking water is a linear function of drinking water price. 
(29)   pmnpQ ˆˆ  .  
Drinking water demand function is obtained with point expansion method. Point expansion method 
is a simple approach for estimating the demand function of water for municipal use, as well as other 
uses. When the slope or elasticity of demand and one point in the demand curve are known, the 
other points can be extrapolated. It is typical that one point in the demand function is known but the 
elasticity needs to be obtained with some other method. Point expansion method assumes linearity 
or constant elasticity in demand, which might not apply to actual human behavior and that is good 
to keep in mind. Yet the technique is powerful in estimating the demand. (Griffin, 2006).  
The basic formula for price elasticity is 
(30)  
p
Q
pd
dQ
Q
p
pd
dQ
ˆ
*
ˆ
ˆ
*
ˆ
  .  
By substituting the known elasticity and point in demand curve in this equation we get the slope      
(
pd
dQ
ˆ
) for the demand curve. When assuming linearity, the demand curve has the form of 
(31)  bpslopeQ  ˆ* .  
Value for constant b is determined by inserting the known values and the calculated slope into the 
equation. (Griffin, 2006). 
It is assumed above that the demand for municipal water is linear. Already Hanemann (1998) 
commented that literature on residential water demand tends to use linear form regardless of its 
inconsistency with economic theory and utility maximization. By adding the aggregate for other 
commodities than water to the linear demand function, where demand for water is regressed on the 
price of water and consumer income ypx    ( is minimum level of consumption), the 
equation can be rendered to fit better with utility maximization: 
22
1
p
y
p
p
x   . (Hanemann 
W. M., 1998). 
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However, Hanemann’s approach requires even more data about household characteristics which is 
not available in this case. Therefore assuming linearity is fair assumption for this study. Point 
elasticity formula has also been used in other studies, for example in Davidson and allies (2009) 
who analyzed water allocation changes within a catchment area.  
4.2. Social optimum 
The social planner’s goal is to maximize welfare in the basin. In this study it means maximizing the 
total economic net benefits e.g. producer surplus. Social planner could also have other objectives 
such as decreasing nutrient runoffs but here the focus is on water quantity rather than quality. Social 
optimum differs from the private optimum because the sum of benefits for upstream and 
downstream is maximized with respect to the hydrological constraint. Therefore the water should be 
allocated efficiently between the two user groups so that their marginal products would again equal 
the marginal costs but now the marginal costs include also shadow prices for water scarcity. The 
objective function for the socially optimal water allocation combines agricultural and municipal 
profit functions: 
(32) 
      MAA dqqgqLqLW    )(1
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However, in reality there is a hydrological constraint relating to water: total water use cannot 
exceed the resource availability e.g. the total usable amount of water A . 
(33)   0ˆ  pQaA ij   
With hydrological constraint the equation turns into Lagrangian optimization problem: 
(34) 
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Assumption is that at least the social planner knows the amount of water or the expected annual 
amount of the resource. This information may be obtained for example from hydrological modeling. 
The letter   is the shadow price of the resource and it reflects the scarcity. When A  is known,   
can be determined by completing a grid search e.g. by calibrating values for    so that the social 
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welfare reaches its highest value. When the value for   is found, both agricultural and municipal 
water uses can then be solved.  
The first order conditions for this equation are similar than in open access situation but now the 
shadow price for water is added.  There is also fundamental difference in the view point since now 
the allocation of water is governed by the authorities and not by individual user entities, as was the 
case in open access. The procedure to determine water use levels is now done simultaneously when 
it previously was completed in turns (Junta doing the first move and municipal water supply system 
being the follower). 
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In social optimum agricultural water use decreases compared to open access because the shadow 
price is introduced. This means that the shadow price internalizes the externality of too extensive 
water use that occurred in open access. Shadow price decreases the numerator while others remain 
the same leading to a situation in which optimal agricultural water use is less than before. Also the 
municipal water supply system equalizes water price with the new marginal cost that includes the 
shadow price of water and withdraws that amount of water. Total water withdrawals must not 
exceed water availability and the hydrological condition must be met but not all water necessarily 
has to be withdrawn. 
Table 10 below summarizes privately and socially optimal agricultural water withdrawals and 
municipal water demand. When components that increase production costs are added, agricultural 
water use decreases.  
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Table 10. Comparison of agricultural water use and municipal water demand in private and 
social optima. 
 Crop 1 Crop 2 Municipal demand 
Private  
 211
111
1
2 qhp
wqhp
a

 
  
 
 222
222
2
2 qhp
wqhp
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
 
  
  pmnpQ ˆˆ   
Social  
 211
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1
2
*
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a

 
  
 
 222
222
2
2
*
qhp
wqhp
a

 
  
    MM cwmnpQ *ˆ  
 
4.3. Introducing payment mechanisms 
When there is an externality that is caused by too extensive use of water upstream, social planner 
needs to define what the optimal water allocation is. That was determined in previous subchapter. In 
order to reach that level of agricultural water use, a subsidy on the reduction of private agricultural 
water use is imposed so that the Junta is encouraged to decrease water withdrawals to the socially 
desired level. The subsidy here presents the payment rate and is paid for all decreased water use 
units. A tax is levied on municipal water withdrawals; to represent the service buyer’s payment. 
Both tax and subsidy are levied on input use. The payment scheme would operate only in times 
when hydrological conditions are unusually dry. 
Subsidies can be presented in multiple ways depending on the PWS design. For example, the 
subsidy could constitute of input reduction and cost-share subsidies: 
(40)    )()1(*max *** ijoijjijjij aarhkawqhafp    
(Khanna, Isik, & Zilberman, 2002) (rewritten from source), where 
oa is the privately optimal water 
withdrawal, *ija is socially optimal water withdrawal, r  is the input reduction subsidy and k  is the 
cost-share subsidy for the conservation technology h  which could be the new improved and more 
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efficient version of old irrigation technology. Hence even simpler way to determine the payment 
would be just a mere input reduction subsidy: 
(41)      jijoijjijjsubsidy caasawqhafp  ****max .  
Yet another way to determine the payment would be to insert a tax that would increase the water 
price and lead to diminished water use, and then recycle the tax back to the taxpayer in form of 
payment: 
(42)    jijjijjtax catwqhafp  ** )(*max .  
Regardless of the chosen instrument, the payment for agriculture is actually determined in the same 
manner by deriving the profit function in terms of applied water. For a subsidy the first order 
condition is: 
(43)     02' *2  swaqhpqhp jijjjijjsubsidy   
Solving the subsidy from the equation yields: 
(44)     jijijjijj waqhpqhps 
*22   
For a tax the first order condition is: 
(45)     02' *2  twaqhpqhp jijjjijjtax   
Solving the tax from the equation yields: 
(46)     jijjjijj waqhpqhpt 
*22   
The first order conditions imply that the payment or subsidy should be equal to the marginal 
revenue. 
For municipal water supply system the payment is determined as a tax that is imposed on its water 
use.  
(47)           pQcpQtwpQp MMM ˆˆˆˆ  
By taking the first order conditions in terms of  pQ ˆ  yields 
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(48) 0ˆ'  MMM ctwp  
and results in a tax that can be determined as: 
(49) MM cwpt  ˆ  
The final payments can be determined as in equations (44) and (49). The idea is that the payment 
scheme would kick in at times when the water availability is below normal level e.g. the privately 
optimal level. Then during water abundant years participants may carry on as they normally would. 
Optimal subsidy can be calculated by inserting the socially optimal water use values into the 
equation. Then, optimal tax for municipal water use is determined in the same manner by inserting 
socially optimal water price into the equation that determines the tax. 
While upstream water use is reduced with subsidy, the costs of production downstream are 
increased by adding the tax or payment for watershed services to downstream production costs. 
Whether the payment or tax t  that water supply system pays equals s  is one issue that has to be 
considered in the very local context because if decreasing the upstream water use to the socially 
optimal level is too costly, downstream can’t afford it and the PWS system does not work as it is 
supposed to. Therefore different funding schemes involving third parties have to be considered. 
However, without taking too strong stand on who is the final payer, here it is supposed that the 
municipal water supply system is responsible for the payment and the payment is transferred from 
the municipal water supply system to the agricultural sector.  
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5. Calibrating the model 
This chapter collects parameters and calibrates the model. The calibration is done for the district of 
Huaral in Chancay-Huaral watershed, because it is the biggest city in terms of habitants and 
economic actors in the watershed. Huaral has the greatest amount of agricultural land compared to 
the other two districts. In addition, most data from Chancay-Huaral watershed in general refers to 
Huaral. Due to incoherent data availability the model is run with data that includes values from 
different years. Yet the values for year 2011 are preferred when possible. Crops chosen to be used 
in the numerical example are maize and cotton, as discussed in chapter 0.  
5.1. Demand functions 
Agriculture 
Response functions for crops are typically approximated based on field studies. Regrettably there is 
not any to be found from Peru. Determining effective water amount based on actual crop water 
requirement in this study is laborious task since there is no detailed plant or area-specific water use 
data from Chancay-Huaral. Also it would require massive amount of climate data and cropping 
knowledge and would be yet another research topic. Therefore the yields are estimated more 
roughly based on easily attainable approximate figures. This simplification has naturally serious 
impacts on the model results. 
Table 11 presents annual variation for cotton and maize in average yields (tons) per hectare in 
Huaral for years 2000-2011. These values together with approximations of water use per hectare are 
used to approximate the crop response functions for the study area. 
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Table 11. Average yield of maize and cotton in Huaral tons/ha. 
Year Maize Cotton 
2000 5.5 2.3 
2001 6.3 2.5 
2002 6.7 2.8 
2003 6.6 3.0 
2004 7.0 3.2 
2005 7.7 2.3 
2006 8.0 2.8 
2007 7.9 2.8 
2008 8.4 2.8 
2009 8.8 3.0 
2010 7.8 2.7 
2011 8.2 2.8 
According to Peruvian Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation maize yields on average 8 tons per 
hectare and requires irrigation 6000-7000m
3
/ha. Yield potential of hybrid seeds is up to 15 t/ha 
depending on used technology. (MINAG, 2013). FAO suggests irrigation of 500-800 mm for total 
growing period (Brouwer & Heibloem, 1986) which is approximately 5000-8000 m
3 
per hectare. 
Let’s assume that yield of 8.8 ton/ha (highest average harvest in Huaral during 2000-2011) is 
attained by applying 8000 m
3
 of water and yield of 5.5 ton/ha (smallest average harvest in Huaral 
during 2000-2011) is attained by applying 5000 m
3
 of water. Following the methodology of 
Boggess et al. (1993), applied water times irrigation efficiency results effective water. Hence 
effective water amount for maize is 2000-3200 m
3
.  
Parameters 111 ,,  for the response function are determined by system of equations (Caswell & 
Zilberman, 1986): 



64002
200020005500
320032008800
2
2

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This system yields a water response function for maize: 
20023.072.1414752 eey  . 
Same procedure is done for cotton. Highest average yield of 3.2 tons/ha was attained in Huaral in 
2004 and lowest 2.3 tons/ha in 2000 and 2005 (Table 11). Ministry of Agriculture advises to irrigate 
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cotton field a total of 8000-10300 m
3
. According to FAO the water requirement is typically between 
700-1300 mm per growing period (Brouwer & Heibloem, 1986), meaning a total amount of 7000-
13000 m
3 
per hectare. Hence it is assumed that 7000 m
3
 yields 2.3 tons and 13000 m
3
 yields 3.2 
tons. This yields a response function for cotton: 
200015625.0625.11025 eey  . 
The assumption is that land quality varies across the agricultural land. The land is divided into 10 
parcels and each parcel is homogenous in land quality. Thus for each parcel the optimal water 
application varies. The variation in land quality is endogenously incorporated in the crop response 
functions by changing parameter  which shifts the parable vertically. The functions are calibrated 
so that the lowest quality parcel yields the minimum and highest quality parcel yields the maximum 
amount. Parcels are assumed to be of same size and evenly distributed. Appendix 2. Agricultural 
functions shows the Excel table for determining the optimal land allocation and agricultural water 
use. 
The response functions obtained with the aforementioned method vary significantly from functions 
used in some other studies in other places, for example in China or USA. According to field study 
conducted by Yin and allies (2014), in semiarid Northeast China maize grain response to water can 
be determined by the equation 
219.7555.23263.10130 IIYI  where I denotes irrigation. The 
maximum maize grain yield 10506 kg/ha was obtained by applying 930.4 m
3
 of water per hectare. 
Also nitrogen and phosphorus were part of their study. Caswell et al. (1990) tested their model with 
cotton in San Joaquin Valley, California. They used values of acre-feet of water per acre and 
pounds of yield per acre and these are converted to cubic meters per hectare and tons per hectare 
values being as follows: a yield of 1.458 tons per hectare is obtained with effective water amount of 
7621 m
3
 and a yield of 1.166 tons is obtained with 5335 m
3
. With these values the response 
function would be:    22 )(0006.0)(91.02027 qhaqhaqhaf iii  . 
Municipal water 
Considering the analysis in Chapter 4.1., demand curve for water demand in Huaral is determined 
with point expansion method. For parameterization of the demand function, own-price elasticity of 
demand and the price and quantity in one point of the demand curve are required. The point in 
demand curve is obtained from local data but the elasticity is obtained on the basis of various 
studies focusing on water demand elasticity. With combination of elasticity -0.41 (Dalhuisen et al. 
2003), water price 1.63 and water amount 3246436 (2011 data) a demand curve 
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  4577475ˆ*816588ˆ  ppQ is established. Here only the water that has been paid is determining 
the demand since that reflects the realized willingness to pay for water. 
Figure 9 shows the demand function for municipal water that is paid for.  
 
Figure 9. Municipal water demand. 
5.2. Other parameters 
Agricultural water in Chancay-Huaral basin is billed by hectares. In Huaral the price is on average 
114.34 S/./ha (ANA-DCPRH, 2011) which equals approximately 30 euros per hectare. However, 
the model incorporates water volumes in cubic meters which indicates that an approximate value 
per cubic meter of agricultural water should be determined. For hectare of cotton farmer may apply 
even 13000 m
3
 and for hectare of maize 8000 m
3
. Hence a price per cubic meter used for cotton is 
0.0088 S/. and for maize 0.0143 S/.. 
The values for agricultural output prices are found from Table 8 and values for municipal water 
price and cost from Table 9. Total acreage for agricultural land in Huaral district in 2011 was 13430 
hectares. Other parameter values for the demand functions are calculated in the chapter above. The 
land area is divided into 10 parcels and it is assumed that the parcels are of equal size or evenly 
distributed. Hence one parcel is 1343 hectares.  
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Fixed costs per hectare are obtained from Peruvian Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation (MINAG, 
2013). Naturally the fixed costs vary by the region, variety and used technology but in the absence 
of real agricultural cost data from the study area, the approximate values from the ministry are used. 
An approximation of fixed cost for cotton in Lima region includes costs for seeds, fertilizers, 
pesticides, water, labor and rent of a tractor. The approximate fixed cost for cotton is 3320.26 S/. in 
Lima region. When the direct water cost is not taken into account the fixed cost for cotton is 
3272.66 S/.. For maize the approximate fixed cost includes direct costs such as labor costs in 
different cultivation stages, machinery costs and costs of inputs (seeds, fertilizers, pesticides and 
water), and indirect costs such as administrative and financial costs, which account for minor share 
of the total cost. The total fixed cost for maize is 2702.28 S/. but without the water cost it is 2652.28 
S/.. 
In the municipal side of the model, for example in equations (25) and (26), a fixed cost  for 
supplying drinking water is presented. This cost is left out from the model run because proper value 
for it could not be found. 
In the social optimum, the hydrological constraint A  is exogenous parameter to the PWS-model 
and is received from hydrological models. If A  exceeds the total private demand of water, PWS 
scheme won’t be effective. When the private demand outweighs the supply, the scheme will 
operate. In this study A  is arbitrarily chosen to be lower than total private water demand. The value 
for A  is set to 125000000. 
 
Table 12 below summarizes the parameters for the model. It is to be noted that 1 and 2  denote 
the land quality impact to crop response function in a certain parcel. Because parcels are 
heterogeneous, the value varies within the group of parcels in the announced range.  
Table 12. Parameters used to run the model simulation. 
Parameter Symbol Value Unit 
Municipal water price pˆ  1.63 S/./m
3
 
Operative cost 
Mc  1.29 S/./m
3
 
Municipal water 
demand, intercept 
parameter 
n  4577475  
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Municipal water 
demand, slope 
parameter  
m  -816588  
Price of maize 
1p  1.0 S/./kg 
Price of cotton 
2p  2.90 S/./kg 
Intercept parameter for 
maize 
1  -14752  
Intercept parameter for 
cotton 
2  -1025  
Parameter reflecting 
land quality for maize 
1  13.82-14.72  
Parameter reflecting 
land quality for cotton 
2  1.445-1.625  
Concavity parameter 
for maize 
1  -0.0023  
Concavity parameter 
for cotton 
2  -0.00015625  
Agricultural water 
price 
w  114.34 S/./ha 
Water price of maize 
1w  0.0143 S/./m
3
 
Water price of cotton 
2w  0.0088 S/./m
3
 
Fixed cost for maize 
1c  2652.28 S/./ha 
Fixed cost for cotton 
2c  3272.66 S/./ha 
Total acreage  13430 ha 
Size of a parcel  1343 ha 
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6. Results 
The following chapter represents the results of the numerical example of the model. It also 
comments some necessary precautions when interpreting the results. 
6.1. Private optimum 
The agricultural crop specific profit curves intercept near the point 0.4 implying that cotton is 
allocated to lower quality parcels and accounts for 40 % of land and maize is allocated to higher 
quality parcels and accounts for 60 % of land. (Figure 10). This land allocation leads to agricultural 
water demand as high as 126.3 MCM when the actual water allotments in Huaral may be even 145 
MCM. Hence this model slightly underestimates the actual agricultural water demand in Huaral but 
the result is nevertheless close enough. A variety of reasons might cause this: selection of only two 
crops that might not best describe the water use in the whole area and uncertainty in how land 
quality affects the water application, among other things. 
 
Figure 10. Crop specific profit curves and land allocation decision in private optimum. 
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1
Land allocation in private optimum 
COTTON
MAIZE
64 
 
Average water application per hectare is 11739 m
3
 for cotton and 7845 m
3
 for maize, while there is 
variation between parcels due variation in land quality. Also production varies accordingly, average 
production being 2457 kg/ha cotton and 8010 kg/ha maize. Per hectare profits are on average 959 € 
for cotton and 1347 € for maize. (Table 14). Overall annual profits for agriculture in private 
optimum rise as high as 16.177 million euros which seems quite high even if this was distributed to 
the 8 irrigation commissions in Huaral and many farmers that form them. However, this profit 
should be taken cautiously as the fixed costs relating to agriculture are only approximations of the 
costs. The costs of agriculture applied here do not include interest costs, costs related to real estates 
or other costs like depreciation of machinery that might decrease the actual profit that farmers 
receive. For a proper estimate of whether the simulated profits are too high or not, the costs in the 
study area should be known in detail. Also the total number of individual farmers and provision of 
the land among these individuals in Huaral district or agricultural income data from the area should 
be known. Unfortunately for the time being this kind of information is not available. 
The simulated water withdrawal by municipal water supply system is same as actual delivered 
water to consumers (3.2 MCM) because of the method used. Demand is approximated based on one 
known point (combination of price and amount of water) and this point is also where the private 
optimum supposedly stands. Annual profit for municipal water supply system is approximately 0.3 
million euros and the price that consumers are asked to pay is around 0.4 €/m3.4 
6.2. Social optimum 
In the social optimum the hydrological constraint is introduced and water availability slightly 
decreased. In open access the total water use is approximately 130 MCM but now the constraint is 
set arbitrarily to 125 MCM (hydrological constraint A ), which implies that allocation of water 
between the two user sectors changes. When A  is set, the welfare maximizing shadow price is 
found by grid search. The highest welfare is obtained when lambda is 0.023. If lambda is less, the 
profit maximizing total water use is higher than the constraint allows, which is not a possible 
situation. Also, when lambda varies between 0.023 and 0.025, the profit maximizing land allocation 
between cotton and maize could be either 30 % cotton and 70 % maize or 40 % cotton and 60 % 
maize. However, the 40% and 60 % allocation results in water use that exceeds the constraint. 
Hence the socially optimal land allocation is 30 % cotton and 70 % maize. Figure 11 shows the 
social welfare values with all lambda values that yield a possible solution from hydrological and 
profit maximization point of views.  
                                                          
4
 For example, price for drinking water in Helsinki is approximately 1.30 €/m3. 
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Figure 11. Grid search of the social welfare maximizing lambda value. 
Figure 12 shows the land allocation decision in social optimum. The actual intersection point where 
the profits are equal and condition (37) met is 0.4 but this allocation yields too great water use, as 
discussed above.  
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Figure 12. Crop specific profit curves and land allocation decision in social optimum (when 
water availability is limited to 125 MCM). 
Total agricultural land allocation, water use volumes, production and profits are shown in Table 13. 
Total water used for cotton is roughly 46.3 MCM and for maize 73.2 MCM. Total production is 9.7 
thousand tons of cotton and 73.8 thousand tons of maize. Total profits for agriculture account for 
approximately 16.173 million euros. 
Average water application per hectare in social optimum is 11501 m
3
 for cotton and 7786 m
3
 for 
maize whereas production is 2408 kg of cotton and 7853 kg of maize. In terms of profits per hectare 
cotton accumulates on average 936 and maize 1319 euros per hectare. (Table 14). 
The municipal water withdrawal in social optimum is 3.5 MCM, which is a small increase 
compared to open access. Drinking water price is smaller than in open access 1.313 S/. per cubic 
meter that is around 0.34 €. The profits of the municipal water supply system are only 20900 euros. 
The decrease in profits is explained by the lower price. Yet it is good to note that the price is set 
differently in private and social optimums.  In private optimum, the water price for municipal water 
supply system is taken as given whereas in social optimum it is equalized with marginal costs. 
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6.3. Payment scheme 
The payment scheme is a combination of two instruments that create the incentive to reach the 
socially optimal water use levels. When a subsidy is imposed on agricultural water use, it would 
increase the total agricultural water demand. However, due to the hydrological constraint, this is not 
possible. The total demand cannot exceed the water availability. This means that the socially 
optimal land allocation is executed in the payment scheme. According to equations (43) and (48), 
when water availability is restricted to 125 MCM the subsidy for agriculture for each cubic meter of 
decreased water is 0.023 S/. and tax for municipal water is the same 0.023 S/.. This equals the 
shadow price for water. 
The payment scheme will only have an effect on profits accrued from agriculture and municipal 
water supply system. Agricultural profit is 16.179 million € and municipal profit is 0 €. Water 
withdrawals and produced amounts of agricultural products remain the same as in social optimum 
but the revenues differ. This can be seen in Table 13 and Table 14. For municipal water supply 
system, introducing a tax means loss in profit compared to other two situations. If total water 
availability is 125 MCM the drinking water price is same as in social optimum: 1.313. S/. per cubic 
meter. However, after tax the municipal water supply system receives zero profits. Therefore the 
payment scheme will decrease the profitability of municipal water supply system. 
6.4. Summary 
In reality total water abstraction in Huaral district accounts for about 151 million cubic meters of 
which 145 MCM accounts for agriculture and 6 MCM for municipal water use. This amount is not 
the overall demand of water in whole Chancay-Huaral basin but the approximate demand of water 
in Huaral district. Simulated demand of water for Huaral is 130 MCM implying that the model 
underestimates the demand. Supposedly Peru will face water stress in the future. When annual 
water availability is lower than the private demand, the payment mechanism would start to operate. 
The hydrological constraint e.g. the water availability is exogenous parameter to the PWS-model 
and is received from hydrological modeling. In this study the constraint is set arbitrarily to 125 
MCM, which is not very drastic decline in water availability. 
These conditions lead to result that are summarized in the Table 13-Table 16 below. Table 13 
shows land allocation and total water use, production amounts and profits for agriculture. It gathers 
agricultural variables from all three phases. When water availability is below normal level, farmers 
need to adapt to the situation by changing the cropping pattern. They allocate more land to the less 
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water needy crop, which in this case is maize. Because cotton and maize have quite similar revenue 
functions (Figure 10 and Figure 12), farmers’ total profits change only little. Yet noticeable changes 
occur in agricultural water use due the change in cropping pattern. 
Table 13. Land allocation, water use volumes, production and profits for agriculture. 
 Land allocation 
(%) 
Water use (MCM) Production 
(million kg) 
Profits (million €) 
 Cotton Maize Cotton Maize Cotton Maize Cotton Maize 
Private 
optimum 
40 60 63.1 63.2 13.2 64.5 5.220 10.957 
Social 
optimum 
30 70 46.3 73.2 9.7 73.8 3.770 12.403 
PWS 
scheme 
30 70 46.3 73.2 9.7 73.8 3.774 12.405 
Table 14 shows the average input, output and profits per agricultural hectare. In private optimum 
water use, production and profits are higher compared to social optimum. On the other hand, the 
PWS scheme increases the agricultural profits compared to social optimum while the input and 
output remain the same. 
Table 14. Average water use volume, production and profits per hectare. 
 Water use (m
3
/ha) Production (kg/ha) Profits (€/ha) 
 Cotton Maize Cotton Maize Cotton Maize 
Private 
optimum 
11739 7845 2457 8010 972 1360 
Social 
optimum 
11501 7786 2408 7853 936 1319 
PWS 
scheme 
11501 7786 2408 7853 937 1320 
Table 15 sums up the sectorial and total profits and welfare in the basin. If the agricultural subsidy 
and municipal tax were to be implemented, the total profits accrued from the two sectors are lowest. 
In social optimum agricultural profits are lower than in private optimum but PWS scheme increases 
agricultural profits even compared to private optimum. Agriculture gets highest profits under the 
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PWS scheme. Hence a payment scheme is attractive from agricultural perspective. Municipal water 
supply system has smallest profits under PWS scheme and greatest profits in private optimum. 
Hence the PWS scheme is not attractive to municipal water supply system. 
Table 15. Profits in agriculture and municipal water supply system. 
 Agricultural 
profits (€) 
Municipal 
profits (€) 
Total 
profits (€) 
Social 
welfare (€) 
Private 
optimum 
16177195 286135 16463330  
Social 
optimum  
16173851 20900 16194750 16149684 
PWS scheme  16179413 0 16179413  
Agricultural water withdrawal is the greatest in private optimum and smallest in socially desired 
optimum. The PWS scheme manages indeed to decrease agricultural water use. The PWS scheme 
also manages to increase municipal water withdrawals, as was the objective. Also total water 
withdrawals are decreased when socially desired outcome is obtained. (Table 16).  
Table 16. Sectorial and total water withdrawals (m
3
). 
 Agriculture Municipal water Total 
Private optimum 126276430 3246437 129522866 
Social optimum 119535294 3505295 123040589 
PWS scheme 119535294 3505295 123040589 
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7. Discussion 
Two problems that Swiech and allies (2012) faced in their study from Peru were the lack of reliable 
reports and the reluctance of some people to cooperate because information is valuable and 
institutions tend to compete with each other. Those two caveats should be taken into account in 
final PWS design so that stakeholders would have incentive and interest in common and community 
welfare and not just their individual wellbeing. That is also important in terms of program 
efficiency and social acceptability. The problem of unreliable reports has also been faced in the 
process of this thesis study. One issue has been for example conflicting datasets and inconsistent 
reporting of datasets.  
The lack of agricultural policies and the fact that water users have to deal with problems in the 
irrigation system by themselves (Swiech et al., 2012) might make PWS program more attractive to 
the area than building a reservoir (which was studied in Swiech et al., 2012) since PWS can provide 
proper incentives to share information and coordinate the water use. Yet a reservoir would have the 
potential to increase the amount of water in dry seasons. However, majority of the agriculture in the 
area is rather industrialized and not subsistence farming and also other than input price may act as 
good incentive. PWS is typically meant for empowering small-scale land owners and in Chancay-
Huaral that is not necessarily the most important aspect because of the high level of industrialized 
production.  
It has been said that increased irrigation efficiency might have reverse environmental effects and 
actually it might not lead to decreased water use if production expands simultaneously. This might 
be unnecessary fear in the Chancay-Huaral river basin since the total land area under irrigation is 
limited so that land area does not increase even if water availability would. Still it might change the 
cropping pattern towards more water needy crops which would indeed increase the total water use. 
Also subsidies may have reverse environmental effects. They might increase water use if there is no 
cap for water withdrawals. As implicated in the results of this study, subsidy or payment for 
agriculture does indeed increase agricultural water use if agriculture can freely choose the profit 
maximizing land allocation after payments have been imposed. However, PWS schemes include the 
conditionality requirement that service providers must secure the service delivery. The first idea in 
this study was that increased water availability would be achieved by increasing irrigation 
efficiency. The PWS scheme was thought to be a way to finance the technical improvement. Now it 
seems that a certain land allocation does the same. Hence the means of the delivery of the 
environmental service might also be the change in cropping pattern. 
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In addition, when costs of adapting new technology are high and producers are heterogeneous, 
incentive-based policies that allow flexibility in technology choice are potentially more effective for 
pollution control than prescribed adoption of precision technology. (Khanna & Zilberman, 1997). 
Therefore if the PWS scheme includes all farmers in the area, it might be better to leave the modern 
technology adoption as means of ES delivery unconditional. Also this supports the choice of a 
certain crop as a condition to participate in the program and as a means to deliver the service of 
increased water availability downstream. Regardless of the chosen way of service delivery, in order 
to achieve the environmental goal of PWS the program needs to have thorough monitoring after 
implementations. Measuring actual water withdrawals in each source point reliably could also be 
one condition for being a service provider in the program. 
There has already been recognizable decrease in acreage allocated for cotton in the basin. Hence it 
might have been noticed by farmers that when water becomes scarcer, cotton is not as profitable to 
cultivate as it used to be. Yet other reasons affecting production should not be ignored. Globally 
large proportion of cotton is produced in China and USA and it is possible that Peru simply has 
difficulties with competing with the larger producers. 
Salinity is totally left out of the analysis. Yet salinity has potential effects on water withdrawals. 
Increase in water salinity increases water withdrawals for salt leaching changes cropping pattern 
and reduces profits obtained from irrigation (Rosegrant, Ringler, McKinney, Cai, Keller, & Donoso, 
2000). This is one more remainder of the complexity of agricultural decision-making process 
performed by both farmers and social planners. However, dataset from Peru is very limited and 
allows only simple analysis relating to water quantities rather than quality, not to even mention their 
interaction.  
Olmstead and Stavins (2006) compared price and non-price conservation policies and concluded 
that water utilities that implemented non-price demand management faced decreases in total 
revenues whereas utilities that increased prices to reduce demand faced increases in total revenues. 
For the PWS scheme their conclusion would imply that the municipal water supply system would 
likely approve the scheme when it can increase the price on consumers’ expense. Yet the increased 
drinking water prices will most likely receive opposition from the consumers and it depends on 
their economic status whether it would be appropriate policy tool development-wise. In this study, 
the socially optimal price for drinking water was smaller than the privately optimal price, which led 
to increase in demand in social optimum.  
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One interesting topic relating to the payment scheme is that how could the payment actually work 
when quite large share of water bills, being it agricultural or municipal, remain unpaid. Reasons for 
not paying for water need to be analyzed first before implementing scheme that increases water 
prices for some users. About 30 % of agricultural water fees and 40 % of municipal water invoices 
are still not paid. If the reason is simply that users cannot afford to pay, the PWS scheme will most 
likely face opposition from consumers. It seems that whether PWS should be considered in 
Chancay-Huaral or not comes down to one question: are the municipal water users willing to pay 
more for their drinking water. 
It is important to remember that no scheme should be implemented if it disturbs the current 
institutions and doesn’t fit into the current institutional context. The current water management 
system is quite complex and has many instruments incorporated already. Even though the water 
management seems vague, there are also interesting characters that already control the water use. 
For instance, the limitation of irrigated land is one factor restricting agricultural water use. Also the 
current gravitational irrigation system or canal system has a certain capacity to deliver and hold 
water. Would it then be even possible and probable that agricultural water use would increase 
significantly? What is not controlling the water use or encouraging to sustainable and efficient use 
of water, however, is the pricing system that is based on acreage rather than volume. To conclude, 
we should learn more about the technicalities of the current system before the PWS scheme is 
declared superior mechanism. Implementing a brand new instrument might make the water 
management even more complex when developing the current system and instruments used in it 
might be as influential. Regardless, the PWS scheme, if more studied, could be one solution, even 
though not the best, to increase water use efficiency and welfare in the Chancay-Huaral basin.  
The results of this study present current production in hypothetical future hydrological conditions. It 
is supposed that the water demand will increase while the climate change may cause increased 
water scarcity in coastal Peru. Even though the water would be enough at the time, problems will 
most likely occur in the future. In order to get more accurate results also the production should be 
projected and adjusted to the future. Also other precautions are in order. The modeled agricultural 
demand underestimates the current water use. This could be because of the chosen crops and lack of 
detailed water use and water need data. In addition, the model has weaknesses in modeling the 
municipal water demand and supply. This part of the model should be further developed in the 
future. For example, the assumption of linear drinking water demand could be studied more and the 
model developed on that behalf. 
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8. Concluding remarks 
This thesis has developed a theoretical model to determine the payments for watershed services 
between agricultural and municipal users. The model consists of three elements: agricultural model, 
municipal water model and hydrological constraint. The agricultural model is a heterogeneous land 
quality reflecting model that is based on profit maximizing behavior of an agricultural decision 
maker. The municipal water supply system operator is also a profit maximizer and its behavior is 
modelled accordingly. The hydrological constraint creates a balance between water supply and 
demand: the total demand that consists of agricultural and municipal demand cannot outweigh the 
supply. These assumptions create the framework in which the PWS model operates. The model is 
solved in three stages. First the private optimum that has open access to water is determined. Then 
the social optimum that takes the hydrological constraint into consideration is determined by 
completing a grid search. In grid search the social welfare maximizing value for the resource 
shadow price is found by testing different values manually. Finally the payment mechanisms are 
added to the problem so that the socially desired water use level is obtained. The model was 
developed so that the PWS mechanism and its feasibility for the Chancay-Huaral basin in coastal 
Peru could be tested. The PWS scheme design was discussed throughout the study but the focus 
was to build and test the model.  
The study results indicate that PWS scheme offers an incentive for agriculture to participate in the 
scheme, but the municipal water supply system does not have as strong incentive because it does 
not generate profit when it participates to the scheme. In the PWS scheme, agricultural profit is 
2218 € higher compared to private optimum while municipal profit is 286135 € less. Therefore, if 
the scheme still was to be implemented, municipal water supply system would probably claim some 
concession on the payment so that it would generate some profit. However, PWS scheme does 
decrease agricultural water use, as was the purpose, if the scheme is bound to socially optimal land 
allocation. It also increases municipal water use because the price determination strategy is different 
compared to the private optimum. Therefore the scheme shows potential in reallocating the water 
resources between the users. 
The main lesson learned from this study is that more information on municipal water users, more 
precisely their ability and willingness to pay for water would be required if implementing the PWS 
scheme was to be taken further. Also, the municipal model should be elaborated further. Data on 
agricultural costs from the study area would also make the results more accurate. 
74 
 
Bibliography 
Allen, D. (2013). The Hydrologic Cycle. Lecture notes. Short Course on Water Cycles and 
Resources: Environmental and Climate Change Impacts. Helsinki University. 
Allen, R. G., Pereira, L. S., Raes, D., & Smith, M. (1998). Crop evapotranspiration: guidelines for 
computing crop water requirements. Irrigation and drainage paper 56. Rome: FAO. 
ANA-DCPRH. (2011). Evaluación de Recursos Hídricos Superficiales en la Cuenca del río 
Chancay-Huaral. Lima: ALA Chancay-Huaral. 
Anton, D. J. (1993). Thirsty cities. Urban environments and water supply in Latin America. Ottawa, 
Ontario: International Development Research Centre. 
Asquith, N. M., Vargas, M. T., & Wunder, S. (2008). Selling two environmental services: In-kind 
payments for bird habitat and watershed protection in Los Negros, Bolivia. Ecological 
Economics, 65(4), 675-684. 
Blackman, A., & Woodward, R. (2010). User financing in national payments for environmental 
services program: Costa Rican hydropower. Ecological Economics, 69(8), 1626-1638. 
Boggess, W., Lacewell, R., & Zilberman, D. (1993). Economics of Water Use in Agriculture. In G. 
A. Carlson, D. Zilberman, & J. A. Miranowski (Eds.), Agricultural and Environmental 
Resource Economics (pp. 319-391). New York: Oxford University Press. 
Booker, J. F., Howitt, R. E., Michelsen, A. M., & Young, R. A. (2012). Economics and the 
modeling of water resources and policies. Natural Resource Modeling, 25(1), 168-218. 
Bouma, J. A., Biggs, T. W., & Bouwer, L. M. (2011). The downstream externalities of harvesting 
rainwater in semi-arid watersheds: An Indian case study. AgriculturalWater Management, 
98(7), 1162–1170. 
Branca, G., Lipper, L., Neves, B., Lopa, D., & Mwanyoka, I. (2011). Payments for Watershed 
Services Supporting Sustainable Agricultural Development in Tanzania. The Journal of 
Environment & Development, 20(3), 278-302. 
Brouwer, C., & Heibloem, M. (1986). Irrigation Water Management: Irrigation Water Needs. 
Rome: FAO. 
Brouwer, R., Tesfaye, A., & Pauw, P. (2011). Meta-analysis of institutional-economic factors 
explaining the environmental performance of payments for watershed services. 
Environmental Conservation, 38(4), 380-392. 
Bulte, E. H., Lipper, L., Stringer, R., & Zilberman, D. (2008). Payments for ecosystem services and 
poverty reduction: concepts, issues, and empirical perspectives. Environment and 
Development Economics, 13(3), 245-254. 
75 
 
Caswell, M. F., & Zilberman, D. (1986). The Effects of Well Depth and Land Quality on the Choice 
of Irrigation Technology. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 68(4), 798-811. 
Caswell, M., Lichtenberg, E., & Zilberman, D. (1990). The Effects of Pricing Policies on Water 
Conservation and Drainage. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 72(4), 883-890. 
Christensen, J. H., Krishna Kumar, K., Aldrian, E., An, S.-I., Cavalcanti, I., de Castro, M., et al. 
(2013). Climate Phenomena and their Relevance for Future Regional Climate Change. In T. 
D.-K. Stocker, Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working 
Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 
Cambridge, UK and New York, USA: Cambridge University Press. 
Dalhuisen, J. M., Florax, R. J., de Groot, H. L., & Nijkamp, P. (2003). Price and Income Elasticities 
of Residential Water Demand: A Meta-Analysis. Land Economics, 79(2), 292-308. 
Davidson, B., Hellegers, P., & Samad, M. (2009). Assessing the Economic Impact of Redistributing 
Water within a Catchment: A Case Study of the Musi Catchment in the Krishna Basin in 
India. Colombo, Sri Lanka: International Water Management Institute. 
EMAPA Huaral S.A. (2012). Memoria Anual 2012. Huaral, Peru. 
Engel, S., Pagiola, S., & Wunder, S. (2008). Designing payments for environmental services in 
theory and practice: An overview of the issue. Ecological Economics, 65(4), 663-674. 
FAO. (2006). Estudio de caso: El Sistema de Información Agraria - Valle de Huaral, Perú. Reducir 
la Brecha Digital. En El Medio Rural. 
FAO. (2013). FAO Statistical Yearbook 2013. World Food and Agriculture. 
George, B., Malano, H., Davidson, B., Hellegers, P., Bharati, L., & Massuel, S. (2011). An 
integrated hydro-economic modelling framework to evaluate water allocation strategies I: 
Model development. Agricultural Water Management, 98, 733-746. 
Griffin, R. C. (2006). Water Resource Economics, the Analysis of Scarcity, Policies and Projects. 
Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Hanemann, M. W., Lichtenberg, E., Zilberman, D., Chapman, D., Dixon, L., Ellis, G., et al. (1987). 
Economic Implications of Regulating Agricultural Drainage to the San Joaquin River. 
Technical Committee Report to the State Water Resources Control Board, Sacramento CA. 
Hanemann, W. M. (1998). Determinants of urban water use. In D. D. Baumann, J. J. Boland, & W. 
M. Hanemann, Urban water demand management and planning (pp. 31-65). McGraw-Hill 
Professional. 
Hanley, N., Shogren, J. F., & White, B. (2001). Introduction to Environmental Economics. Oxford 
University Press. 
Hargreaves, G. H., & Samani, Z. A. (1985). Reference crop evapotranspiration from temperature. 
Applied Engineering in Agriculture, ASABE, 1(2), 96-99. 
76 
 
Hautakangas, S., & Ollikainen, M. (2014). The impacts of alternative nutrient policies on water 
supplying and abating firms. (Article submitted in 2014). 
Heady, E., & Dillon, J. (1988). Agricultural production functions (Vol. First Indian Edition). New 
Delhi, India: Kalyani Publishers. 
Huamanchumo, J., Peña, Y., Silva, L., & Hendriks, J. (2008). Developing capacity in water users 
organizations: The case of Peru. Irrigation and Drainage, 57, 300-310. 
INEI. (2013). Estadísticas de Medio Ambiente. Retrieved January 14, 2013, from Instituto Nacional 
de Estadística e Informatica: http://www.inei.gob.pe/estadisticas/indice-tematico/medio-
ambiente/ 
Johansson, R. C., Tsur, Y., Roe, T. L., Doukkali, R., & Dinar, A. (2002). Pricing irrigation water: a 
review of theory and practice. Water Policy, 4, 179-199. 
Khanna, M. (1995). Technology adoption and the abatement of greenhouse gases: The thermal 
power sector in India. In Ph.D. Dissertation. Berkeley: University of California. 
Khanna, M., & Zilberman, D. (1997). Incentives, precision technology and environmental 
protection. Ecological Economics, 23(1), 25-43. 
Khanna, M., Isik, M., & Zilberman, D. (2002). Cost-effectiveness of alternative green payment 
policies for conservation technology adoption with heterogeneous land quality. Agricultural 
Economics, 27(2), 157-174. 
Kosoy, N., Martinez-Tuna, M., Muradian, R., & Martinez-Alier, J. (2007). Payments for 
environmental services in watersheds: insights from a comparative study of three cases in 
Central America. Ecological Economics, 61(2-3), 446-455. 
Lankoski, J., & Ollikainen, M. (2003). Agri-environmental externalities: a framework for designing 
targeted policies. European Review of Agricultural Economics, 30(1), 51-75. 
Lichtenberg, E. (1989). Land Quality, Irrigation Development, and Cropping Patterns in the 
Northern High Plains. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 71(1), 187-194. 
MEA. (2005). Freshwater Ecosystem Services. In MEA, Ecosystems and Human Well-
being:Current State and Trends, Volume 1 (pp. 213-255). 
MINAG. (2013). Ministerio de Agricultura y Riego. Retrieved June 19, 2014, from Sector Agrario: 
http://www.minag.gob.pe/portal/sector-agrario/agricola 
Molden, D., Murray-Rust, H., Sakthivadivel, R., & Makin, I. (2003). A Water productivity 
Framework for Understanding and Action. In J. W. Kijne, R. Barker, & D. Molden (Eds.), 
Water Productivity in Agriculture: Limits and Opportunities for Improvement. CABI Pub. 
Olmstead, S. M., & Stavins, R. N. (2006, November 15). Managing Water Demand: Price vs. Non-
Price Conservation Programs. Prepared for the Pioneer Institute for Public Policy Research 
. Boston, Massachusetts. 
77 
 
Porras, I., Grieg-Gran, M., & Neves, N. (2008). All that glitters: A review of payments for 
watershed services in developing countries. London: International Institute for Environment 
and Development. 
Quintero, M., Wunder, S., & Estrada, R. D. (2009). For services rendered? Modeling hydrology and 
livelihoods in Andean payments for environmental schemes. Forest Ecology and 
Management, 258(9), 1871-1880. 
Raben, K. (2007). Access to water and payment for environmental services, Jequetepeque 
watershed, Peru. DIIS Working Paper no 2007/10. Copenhagen, Denmark: Danish Institute 
for International Studies. 
Renner, I. (2010). Compensation scheme for upstream farmers in municipal protected area, Peru. 
TEEB. 
Rosegrant, M. W., Ringler, C., McKinney, D. C., Cai, X., Keller, A., & Donoso, G. (2000). 
Integrated economic-hydrologic water modeling at the basin scale: the Maipo river basin. 
Agricultural Economics, 24, 33-46. 
Singh, A., & Panda, S. N. (2013). Development and application of an optimization model for the 
maximization of net agricultural return. Agricultural Water Management, 115, 267-275. 
Soil Water. (2013). Retrieved December 12, 2013, from Plant & Soils Sciences eLibrary: 
http://passel.unl.edu/pages/informationmodule.php?idinformationmodule=1130447039&top
icorder=10&maxto=10 
Steduto, P., Hsiao, T. C., Fereres, E., & Raes, D. (2012). Crop yield response to water. Irrigation 
and drainage paper 66. Rome: FAO. 
SUNASS. (2009). Estudio Tarifario. Determinacion de la formula tarifaria, estructura tarifaria y 
metas de gestion aplicable a la empresa municipal de agua potable y alcantarillado de 
Huaral - EMAPA Huaral S.A.  
Swiech, T., Ertsen, M. W., & Pererya, C. M. (2012). Estimating the impacts of a reservoir for 
improved water use in irrigation in the Yarabamba region, Peru. Physics and Chemistry of 
the Earth, 47-4, 64-75. 
TEEB. (2010). Payments for Ecosystem Services and Conservation Banking. In The Economics of 
Ecosystems and Biodiversity for Local and Regional Policy Makers. 
Typsa Group. (2013). Plan de gestión de recursos hídricos de la cuenca Chancay-Huaral. Versión 
pendiente de ser aprobada por el CRHC Chancay-Huaral.  
UN-Water. (2013). Drinking water and sanitation statistics. Retrieved December 19, 2013, from 
UN-Water: http://www.unwater.org/statistics_san.html 
Vera, R. R. (2000). Country Pasture/Forage Resource Profiles. (J. M. Suttie, & S. G. Reynolds, 
Eds.) Retrieved December 9, 2013, from FAO Country Pasture Profiles: 
http://www.fao.org/ag/AGP/AGPC/doc/Counprof/Peru/Peru.htm 
78 
 
Wunder, S. (2005). Payments for Environmental Services: Some Nuts and Bolts. Occasional Paper 
No. 42. Bogor: CIFOR. 
Yin, G., Gu, J., Zhang, F., Hao, L., Cong, P., & Liu, Z. (2014). Maize Yield Response to Water 
Supply and Fertilizer Input in a Semi-Arid Environment of Northeast China. PLoS ONE, 
9(1). 
Zheng, H., Robinson, B. E., Liang, Y.-C., Polasky, S., Ma, D.-C., Wang, F.-C., et al. (2013). 
Benefits, costs, and livelihood implications of a regional payment for ecosystem service 
program. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 
110(41), 16681-16686. 
 
 
  
79 
 
Appendix 1. Agricultural water allotments in Chancay-Huaral 
Table 17. Juntas and water allotment volumes in Chancay-Huaral basin 2004-2005 
DISTRICT IRRIGATION IRRIGATION BLOCK MAXIMUM 
ENDOWMENT 
GRANTED VOLUME (m3) 
COMMITTEE PER BLOCK SURFACE GROUNDWATER LEAKAGE 
Aucallama Boza Aucallama Boza Alta 4966000 4820280 1515839 37500 
Boza Baja 1545000 1518025 500499 - 
San Jose Aucallama 5838000 5811127 - - 
Aucallama Caqui Caqui-rio 5637000 5608193 285776 - 
Pisquillo - - - 572819 
Sector 6 - - - 1647150 
Huaral Chancay Alto Chancay Alto-rio 9537000 9504671 1091688 - 
Filtraciones Santa Rosa - - - 2101627 
Chancay Chancay Bajo Chancay Bajo-filtracion - - - 2368312 
Chancay bajo-filtracion y rio 4737000 4747111 - - 
Chancay bajo rio 17378000 16671221 563106 - 
Chancay Chancayllo Chancayllo - - - 19665943 
Huaral Cuyo Cuyo 7205000 7210861 - - 
Lumbra 880000 880405 - - 
Huaral Huando Huando 19878000 19804019 994860 - 
Malaca 128000 128340 - - 
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Huaral Huayan 
Hornillon 
Galindo - - - 683625 
Huayan Hornillos-rio 3973000 3992943 - - 
Huayan bajo-filtraciones rio 1525000 1518985 - - 
Huaral Jesus del Valle Jesus del Valle-filtraciones 155000 685796 264742 - 
Jesus del Valle- rio 21268000 21225388 2288132 - 
Huaral La Esperanza Filtraciones Granados     - 227175 
La Esperanza-rio 59766000 55735409 391034 - 
Chancay Las Salinas Salinas Alto 838000 830774 - - 
Salinas Bajo 681000 657428 - - 
Salinas medio 1 and 2 261000 260820 - - 
Aucallama La Palpa Orcon -   - - 
Palpa - rio 22236000 22222584 1530066 - 
Aucallama Pasamayo Manglar 171000 170621 - - 
Pasamayo alto 1270000 1267859 360349 - 
Pasamayo bajo 2736000 2732595 - - 
Huaral Retes Naturales Las Delicias - - 1024075 - 
Retes Naturales-filtraciones - - - 11117974 
Retes Naturales-rio 21925000 21734795 1184640 - 
Aucallama San Jose 
Miraflores 
Miraflores-filtraciones - 32372 - 5304830 
San Jose-rio 5087000 5087039 403066 - 
Huaral San Miquel Cascajal 983000 982714 - - 
Huamacho 443000 443343 - - 
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Pasabroncano Alto 393000 393291 - - 
Pasabroncano Bajo 221000 - - - 
Quisque Alto 420000 420001 - - 
Quisque Bajo 363000 362773 - - 
Aucallama Saume Pacaraos 323000 323415 - - 
Quipullin 1322000 1304076 - - 
Santo Domingo 826000 825797 - - 
Saume 1531000 1498706 - - 
   MMC 221,41   
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Appendix 2. Agricultural functions 
Tables below present the agricultural coefficients for cotton and maize. The ten rows represent the parcels. Each parcel is of different land 
quality, leading to different optimal water application and yield. Columns starting from “land quality” up to “fixed cost” determine the values in 
columns from “applied water” to “profits”. The latter are result of equations that are derived in equations 12, 13 and 17. 
Table 18. Agricultural coefficients for cotton. 
Land 
quality 
Response coefficients Irrigation 
efficiency 
Output 
price 
Water 
price 
Fixed 
cost 
Applied water Effective 
water 
 Yield  Profits 
(S/.) 
 Profit
s (€) 
q α β γ h(q) p w c a e y π π 
0,1 -1025 1,44
5 
0,00015625 0,4 2,9 0,0087953
8 
3272.6
6 
11499 4600 2316 3342 866 
0,2 -1025 1,46
5 
0,00015625 0,4 2,9 0,0087953
8 
3272.6
6 
11659 4664 2409 3611 936 
0,3 -1025 1,48
5 
0,00015625 0,4 2,9 0,0087953
8 
3272.6
6 
11819 4728 2503 3883 1007 
0,4 -1025 1,50
5 
0,00015625 0,4 2,9 0,0087953
8 
3272.6
6 
11979 4792 2599 4159 1078 
0,5 -1025 1,52
5 
0,00015625 0,4 2,9 0,0087953
8 
3272.6
6 
12139 4856 2696 4439 1151 
0,6 -1025 1,54
5 
0,00015625 0,4 2,9 0,0087953
8 
3272.6
6 
12299 4920 2794 4722 1224 
0,7 -1025 1,56
5 
0,00015625 0,4 2,9 0,0087953
8 
3272.6
6 
12459 4984 2894 5009 1299 
0,8 -1025 1,58
5 
0,00015625 0,4 2,9 0,0087953
8 
3272.6
6 
12619 5048 2994 5300 1374 
0,9 -1025 1,60
5 
0,00015625 0,4 2,9 0,0087953
8 
3272.6
6 
12779 5112 3097 5595 1450 
1 -1025 1,62
5 
0,00015625 0,4 2,9 0,0087953
8 
3272.6
6 
12939 5176 3200 5893 1528 
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Table 19. Agricultural coefficients for maize. 
Land 
quality 
Response coefficients Irrigation 
efficiency 
Output 
price 
Water 
price 
Fixed 
cost 
Applied water Effective 
water 
 Yield  Profits 
(S/.) 
 Profit
s (€) 
q α β γ h(q) p w c a e y π π 
0,1 -14752 13,82 0,0023 0,4 1 0,014292
5 
2652.2
8 
7491 2997 6008 3249 842 
0,2 -14752 13,92 0,0023 0,4 1 0,014292
5 
2652.2
8 
7546 3018 6309 3549 920 
0,3 -14752 14,02 0,0023 0,4 1 0,014292
5 
2652.2
8 
7600 3040 6613 3852 999 
0,4 -14752 14,12 0,0023 0,4 1 0,014292
5 
2652.2
8 
7654 3062 6919 4157 1078 
0,5 -14752 14,22 0,0023 0,4 1 0,014292
5 
2652.2
8 
7709 3084 7227 4465 1157 
0,6 -14752 14,32 0,0023 0,4 1 0,014292
5 
2652.2
8 
7763 3105 7537 4774 1238 
0,7 -14752 14,42 0,0023 0,4 1 0,014292
5 
2652.2
8 
7818 3127 7850 5086 1318 
0,8 -14752 14,52 0,0023 0,4 1 0,014292
5 
2652.2
8 
7872 3149 8164 5399 1400 
0,9 -14752 14,62 0,0023 0,4 1 0,014292
5 
2652.2
8 
7926 3170 8481 5715 1482 
1 -14752 14,72 0,0023 0,4 1 0,014292
5 
2652.2
8 
7981 3192 8800 6034 1564 
 
